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Transnational Class Actions and the Illusory
Search for Res Judicata
Tanya J. Monestier*
The transnational class action-a class action m which a portion of the class consists of
non-US claimants-is her to stay Defendants typically resist the certfication of tansnatonal
class actions on the basis that such actions provide no assurance offinality for a defendant, as it
will always be possible for a non-US. class member to initiate subsequent proceedings in a
foreign court. In response to this concem, many US courts will analyze whether the "home"
courts of the foreign class members would accord res judicata effect to an eventual US.
judgment prior to certifjing a US class action contaking foreign class members. The more
likely the foreign court is tolecognize a US. class judgment, the more likely an American court
will include those foreigners in the US class action.
Current scholaship accepts propnety of the res judicata analysis but questions the
manner in which the analysis is caried out. 772Ts Article breaks from the existing literature by
arguing that the dynamics of class litigation render the resjudicata effect of an eventual US
class judgment inherently unknowable to a US court ex ante. In particulai I argue that certain
liigation dynarmics"-specifically the process ofproving foreign law via experts, the pririciple
ofparty prosecution, and the litigation posture of the action-complicate the transnational class
action landscape and prevent a court from accurately analyzing the res judicata issues at play
7his is exacerbated by the 'structural dynamics" of class litigation: the complexity of foreign
law on the rcognition and enforcement ofjudgments, the newness of class action law in most
foreign countries, and the distnction between general and fact-specific grounds for
nonenforcement ofa US classjudgment Accordngly largue that US courts should abandon
their illusory search for rs judicata.
Instead courts should avoid the rsjudicata problem altogether by employing an opt-in
mechanism for foreign class plaintiffs, whereby such plaintiffs are not bound unless they
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this Article. The author would also like to thank Joshua Dunn for his invaluable research
assistance; a special thank you as well to Benjamin Guimarra who assisted with an early draft
of this Article.
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affimatively undertake to be bound by US class judgment An opt-in mechanism for foreign
planttffs also provides several advantages over the currnt opt-out mechanism: it allows all
foreign clainants to participate in US litigation if they so choose; it provides additional due
process protections for absent foreign claimants; it respects international comity; and it
sufficiently deters defendant misconduct.
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The time is long past when U.S. class actions played themselves out on
the purely domestic stage. The new paradigm is one in which
certification in U.S. litigation is sought for a class consisting heavily
and possibly even preponderantly of nationals or residents of other
countries. The emergence of multinational classes in securities,
antitrust, and mass tort claims is something we can expect in a world of
truly international markets. Of course, the multinational character of
today's classes complicates class action practice significantly.
I. INTRODUCTION
The globalization of corporate, consumer, and securities markets
has led broadly to the globalization of litigation, and specifically to the
emergence of transnational class actions. A transnational class action
is one in which some portion of the class consists of non-U.S.
claimants.2 One author observes: "[F]rom the first time a U.S. lawyer
created a class of plaintiffs ... without explicitly limiting that
definition to citizens/residents/parties within the geographical limits of
the United States, the courts of this country have entertained
1. George A. Bermann, US. Class Actions and the "Global Class," 19 KAN. J.L. &
PUB. PoLY 91, 93 (2009).
2. These class actions are sometimes referred to as "international," "transborder,"
"worldwide," "global," "multinational," or "multijurisdictional" class actions to denote the
fact that they encompass claimants from outside the United States. For ease of reference, I
will use the term "transnational" throughout this Article to refer to a U.S. class action
containing foreign plaintiffs.
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[transnational] class actions."' American courts have certified
transnational class actions in a variety of substantive areas including
securities, product liability, mass tort, consumer protection, and
antitrust.
Transnational class actions have come to be perceived as vehicles
for the redress of wrongs that cross international boundaries. The
common sense rationale put forward by proponents of transnational
class actions is that, whether a plaintiff purchased a defective product
or an overvalued security in Australia, Belgium, or the United States,
where the underlying conduct is the same, such claims should be
handled in a unitary forum-that forum being, of course, a U.S. court.!
3. Rex R. Perschbacher, Lawyers and Ethical Issues/Considerations in Cross-Border
ClassAction Litigation, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REv 735, 736.
4. The problem, arguably, is that while the scope of the impugned conduct that is the
subject of the litigation may be international, the forum in which it is adjudicated is
necessarily territorially circumscribed. Professor Richard Nagareda describes this problem as
one of "regulatory mismatch." He posits that the structural dynamics of aggregate litigation,
including class litigation, arise from the relationship between the following features: "(1) the
scope of the [impugned] activity that is the subject of the litigation [that is, what is the
aggregate litigation about?], (2) the desired scope of preclusive effect for the judgment in the
aggregate proceeding [that is, who is to be precluded thereby?], and (3) the territorial
authority of the government that has constituted the [forum] court [that is, where the litigation
is to take place?]." Richard A. Nagareda, Aggregate Litigation Across the Atlantic and the
Future of American Exceptionalism, 62 VAND. L. REv. 1, 10-11 (2009). As commerce
becomes increasingly global, there is a desire for the scope of preclusion in aggregate
litigation to expand commensurately with the underlying activity in question. At the risk of
oversimplifying, there is a desire for global preclusion to global misconduct. This, in turn,
places enormous pressure on the remaining feature of aggregate litigation dynamics: the
scope of authority wielded by the government in which the forum court operates. As long as
the scope of the underlying activity, the scope of preclusion, and the territorial authority of the
court operate in tandem, there is likely to be little controversy. However, problems arise when
these three structural features of aggregate litigation fall out of synchronization with one
another. Nagareda elaborates:
In our world, no formal political state has authority of a scope
commensurate with modem global business. As a result, our world is one that
virtually invites regulatory mismatches. The underlying dispute is likely to be
global, as might well be the desired preclusive scope for litigation. But aggregate
litigation necessarily must proceed in some court within some government whose
territorial authority stops considerably short of the entire globe. When the
underlying activity transcends state boundaries, it may be possible procedurally to
limit the resulting judgment to the territorial boundaries of the state that has
constituted the rendering court. But one or the other side in the litigation-quite
possibly, both-might well regard such a limitation as undesirable in practical
terms .... The desired preclusive effect of the judgment in the aggregate
proceeding then would expand so as to be commensurate with the scope of the
underlying dispute.
Id. at 13 (footnote omitted).
American class actions that include foreign claimants and purport to resolve issues that
are decidedly international in scope squarely raise problems of regulatory mismatch.
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Defendants resisting the certification of a class action containing
foreign claimants have tended to argue that the inclusion of foreigners
in a U.S. class action raises serious due process concerns. Specifically,
defendants maintain that transnational class actions provide no
assurance of finality for a defendant because it will always be possible
for a non-US. class member to initiate subsequent proceedings in a
foreign court. If the foreign court does not accord preclusive, or res
judicata effect5 to the U.S. class judgment, the defendant will face the
risk of relitigation abroad. According to defendants, it is unfair for
foreign claimants to get "two bites at the apple" at defendants'
expense: once in a U.S. court in the original class proceeding and once
in a foreign court that refuses to give effect to the resultant U.S. class
judgment.
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is silent on the
inclusion of foreign plaintiffs in U.S. classes, thus leaving courts with
little direction on whether, or under what circumstances, to include
foreign claimants in a U.S. class action. However, most U.S. courts
confronted with the issue have been responsive to the due process
concerns raised by defendants. Thus, courts have tended to focus on
the question of whether the foreign class members' "home"
jurisdiction would accord preclusive effect to a U.S. class judgment.
Consequently, prior to including Italians within a U.S. class, the U.S.
court would ask: "Would an Italian court grant preclusive effect to a
U.S. class judgment in this case?" If the U.S. court conducting the
certification analysis determines that the Italian court would likely
grant preclusive effect to an eventual U.S. judgment, the court would
include Italian claimants within the U.S. class. Conversely, if the U.S.
court determines that an Italian court would likely not grant preclusive
effect to the U.S. class judgment, the court would not include Italian
claimants within the class. The nuanced response of U.S. courts to the
res judicata problem is an attempt to walk a fine line between
extending the perceived benefits of U.S.-style aggregation to foreign
Generally speaking, American courts have been cognizant of the potential for regulatory
mismatches in transnational class litigation. Though the class action jurisprudence itself does
not use the term "regulatory mismatch," it is nonetheless clear that many courts are struggling
with how to reconcile territoriality, preclusion, and conduct that transcends borders.
5. The terms "res judicata" and "preclusion" (or any variation thereof) are used
interchangeably throughout this Article to signify the idea that a foreign court will recognize
a U.S. class judgment as binding against a foreign absent class member and prevent that class
member from litigating the claim in the foreign court. See 18 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL.,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4402 (2d ed. 2002) (addressing the terminology of res
judicata).
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claimants and ensuring that defendants in class litigation are not
deprived of due process protections.
In this Article, I challenge the assumption that it is possible for
U.S. courts to predict ex ante the eventual res judicata effect of their
own judgments abroad and question the normative underpinnings of
this practice. While others have noted some of the complications
generally posed by the existence of transnational class actions,' there
has been little academic treatment accorded to the propriety of
including foreign claimants in U.S. class actions based upon a U.S.
court's determination of the anticipated preclusive effect of a class
judgment abroad. Accordingly, this Article represents the only
sustained doctrinal challenge to the current practice employed by U.S.
courts in ascertaining foreign claimants' membership in a U.S. class
action.! In addition, this Article seeks to set forth an alternative to
6. See, e.g., Debra Lyn Bassett, US. ClassAcdons Go Global Transnational Class
Actions and Personal Jurisdiction, 72 FORDHAM L. REv. 41 (2003); Bermann, supma note 1;
Ilana T. Buschkin, Note, The Viability of Class Action Lawsuits in a Globalized Economy-
Permitting Foreign Claimants To Be Members of Class Action Lawsuits in the US Federal
Courts, 90 CORNELL L. REv 1563 (2005). This is particularly true in the area of securities
fraud. See, eg., Hannah L. Buxbaum, Multinational Class Actions Under Federal Securities
Law: Managing Jurisdictional Confict, 46 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 14 (2007); Stephen J.
Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, The Dangerous Extratenitoiality ofAmeican Securities Law,
17 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 207 (1996); Stephen J. Choi & Linda J. Silberman, Trausnational
Litigation and Global Securities Class-Action Lawsuits, 2009 Wis. L. REv. 465.
7. Rhonda Wasserman offers a different critique related to the current practice of
U.S. courts attempting to predict the res judicata effect of a class judgment abroad.
Wasserman's argument is that U.S. courts are not going far enough in the analysis because the
courts fail to appreciate the distinction between recognition and preclusion. As such, she
submits: "It is not enough for American courts entertaining motions to certify transnational
class actions to determine whether an American judgment will be recognized abroad. They
also need to determine the preclusive effects, if any, that the judgment will have if it is
recognized abroad." Rhonda Wasserman, Tmnsnational Class Actions and Inter]urisdictional
Preclusion, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 313, 379 (2011). Wasserman's critique assumes the
propriety of U.S. courts engaging in the recognition/preclusion analysis as part of the
certification inquiry. This Article, however, takes issue with the premises under which
Wasserman operates: that U.S. courts can and shouldpredict the eventual preclusive effect of
class judgments abroad as a means of determining whether to include foreign claimants in a
U.S. class action. See id. Similarly, Michael Murtagh purports to critique the current
practice of U.S. courts predicting the res judicata effect of foreign judgments, but he
ultimately proposes a solution that accepts the propriety of excluding or including foreign
class members based on this res judicata prediction. See Michael P. Murtagh, The Rule
23(b)(3) Supenonty Requirement and Transnational ClassActions: Excludng Foreign Class
Members in Favor ofEuropean Remedies, 34 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 1, 2-3 (2011)
(proposing that foreign claimants be excluded or included in U.S. class actions where the
evidence is "clear" either way and that where the evidence of res judicata is "unclear,"
American courts should err on the side of caution by excluding foreign claimants). Finally,
Linda Sandstrom Simard and Jay Tidmarsh offer an economic critique of what they refer to as
"the Bersch-Vivendi rule" and propose instead a series of four steps to guide courts in
determining whether to include or exclude foreign class members from a transnational class
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outright inclusion or exclusion of foreign class members from
American class actions based on the predicted res judicata effect of an
eventual judgment: the possibility of an opt-in class action for foreign
claimants.
The Article proceeds as follows: In Part II, I discuss the
certification of transnational class actions under Rule 23, with
particular attention paid to the varying standards of proof that courts
employ in assessing res judicata concerns. In Part HI, I call into
question the practice of U.S. courts speculating as to the eventual res
judicata effect of a U.S. judgment in a foreign court; I do so by
analyzing both the litigation and structural restrictions on the search
for res judicata. First, I argue that certain litigation dynamics-the
proving of foreign law via expert testimony, the principle of party
prosecution, and the distinction between contested certification and
settlement certification-obscure the analysis and prevent a U.S. court
from accurately being able to assess whether a foreign court would
accord preclusive effect to a U.S. class judgment. Second, I argue that
in addition to these litigation dynamics, there are serious structural
restrictions on the search for res judicata. In particular, I contend that
the complexity of foreign law on the recognition and enforcement of
judgments, the newness of class action law in most foreign countries,
and the distinction between general and fact-specific grounds for
nonenforcement of a U.S. class judgment render the res judicata effect
of an eventual U.S. class judgment inherently unknowable to a U.S.
court ex ante. In Part IV I argue that an opt-in mechanism presents a
more principled approach to the inclusion of foreign claimants in U.S.
class actions. An opt-in class action for foreign claimants eliminates
the res judicata problem altogether because a foreign claimant who has
affirmatively evidenced his intent to be bound to a result (through the
act of opting in) cannot later challenge the authority of the adjudicating
court to render judgment against him. An opt-in mechanism for
foreign plaintiffs also provides several advantages over the current opt-
out mechanism: it allows all foreign claimants to participate in U.S.
litigation if they so choose; it provides additional due process
protections for absent foreign claimants; it respects international
comity; and it sufficiently deters defendant misconduct.
action. See Linda Sandstrom Simard & Jay Tidmarsh, Foreign Citizens in Tansnational
ClassActions, 97 CORNELL L. REv. (forthcoming 2012).
20 11] 7
TULANELA WREVIEW
II. CERTIFICATION OF TRANSNATIONAL CLASSES UNDER RULE 23
In most U.S. class actions, plaintiffs seek certification under Rule
23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or its respective state
analogue.8 Rule 23(b)(3) authorizes the creation of an opt-out class
action for damages in cases where "the court finds that the questions
of law or fact common to class members predominate over any
questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is
superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudi-
cating the controversy."' As its name suggests, an opt-out class action
will bind any class member who does not take proactive steps to
exclude himself from the proceeding. Opt-out class actions are said to
comport with due process as long as absent class members are
provided with certain procedural safeguards: adequate representation
at all times, notice, and an opportunity to opt out of the class.o Where
absent class members have been afforded these due process
protections, they are precluded from subsequently relitigating their
claim in another jurisdiction by virtue of the doctrine of res judicata."
The majority of transnational class actions are brought as opt-out
actions under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Unfortunately, Rule 23 is silent on its geographical scope and does not
speak to whether, or under what conditions, foreign plaintiffs may be
included in American class actions. Consequently, U.S. courts
currently lack coherent direction on how to proceed in the face of a
motion for certification of a class that encompasses foreign plaintiffs.
In seeking to certify a transnational class, plaintiffs will typically
argue that a class action should encompass all aggrieved plaintiffs,
regardless of where they are situated. Plaintiffs will assert that the
goals underlying class actions, in particular access to justice, judicial
economy, and deterrence, are better served through a unitary
proceeding that purports to resolve the claims of both U.S. and non-
8. THOMAS E. WILLGING ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., EMPIRICAL STUDY OF CLASS
ACTIONS IN FOUR FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS: FINAL REPORT To THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
ON CIVIL RULES 22 (1996) ("The largest number of certified classes-eighty-four (61%)-
were in the (b)(3) category.").
9. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
10. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811-12 (1985).
I1. More specifically, once a U.S. court issues a judgment, courts in other U.S. states
will grant the judgment preclusive effect in accordance with the Full Faith and Credit Clause
of the U.S. Constitution. Preclusion is seen as the "centerpiece" of the opt-out class action.
In the words of one commentator, "A class action defendant must be able to enter into a
settlement, or proceed to judgment, with the assurance that members of the plaintiff class will
not later be able to lodge the same claims again in another forum. Class actions involving
only U.S. plaintiffs provide this assurance." Buxbaum, supm note 6, at 31 (footnote omitted).
8 [Vol. 86:1
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U.S. class members.12 Plaintiffs' arguments clearly carry an intuitive
appeal: if a U.S. court can provide redress for global wrongs via a
class action, why should the class not include these foreign claimants?
Defendants, on the other hand, will typically resist the inclusion
of foreign class members in U.S. class actions on the basis that they
face increased financial liability without the concomitant assurance of
finality. This is because a foreign class member who is displeased
with the result of the U.S. class action can bring a subsequent action in
the courts of his home country." If the foreign court permits the action
to proceed, the plaintiff will get a "second bite" at the apple, 4 despite
the fact that his claim was purportedly resolved in a U.S. proceeding."
Defendants thus assert that they are deprived due process by the
omnipresent prospect of relitigation" in foreign courts." In effect,
defendants posit a "heads you win, tails I lose" scenario whereby a
foreign plaintiff is entitled to the benefit of a favorable result in a U.S.
class proceeding but is not bound by an unfavorable result. In this
respect, litigating or settling a class action on a nationwide basis is
fundamentally different than doing so on a transnational basis." In the
former scenario, defendants are virtually guaranteed the judgment will
be binding under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, provided, of course,
12. For authors expressing this view, see Peter M. Saparoff & Katharine Coughlin
Beattie, The Benefits ofIncluding Foreign Investors in US. Securities Class Action Suits, m
SECURITIEs LITIGATION: PLANNING AND STRATEGIES 669, 671 (2008); Buschkin, supra note 6,
at 1564-66.
13. This also applies to a foreign claimant who did not receive the notice or did not
apprehend its significance and thus failed to act.
14. Daniel P Shapiro & Gail H. Kim, US Class Actions with Non-US Citizens as
Class Members: Fairness Issues Considered 11 Bus. L. INT'L 39,41 (2010).
15. Choi & Silberman, supnr note 6, at 480 ("The argument of defendants in resisting
class-action lawsuits that include foreign investors is that if they, as defendants, are
successful, they may still face a potential lawsuit in a foreign jurisdiction brought by the
absent class plaintiffs.").
16. The term "relitigation" may be a bit of a misnomer in this context. This is
because it is likely that a foreign claimant who is seeking to litigate the claim in a foreign
jurisdiction (presumably his "home" court) has not participated in any way in the U.S.
proceeding. Rather, that foreign claimant has "litigated" the claim in the United States only
by virtue of his inclusion in the class definition.
17. See Choi & Silberman, supra note 6, at 482 (noting that in Vivend, "defendants
... argued that the lack of 'preclusion protection' amounted to a due process violation").
Whether the question of preclusion is, in fact, a due process issue is beyond the scope of this
Article.
18. Note that almost all class actions result in settlement rather than a trial on the
merits. See Samuel Issacharoff& Richard A. Nagareda, Class Settlements UnderAttack, 156
U. PA. L. REv. 1649, 1650 (2008) ("Settlements dominate the landscape of class actions. The
overwhelming majority of civil actions certified to proceed on a class-wide basis and not
otherwise resolved by dispositive motions result in settlement, not trial.").
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that the plaintiffs were accorded due process." Conversely, in the latter
scenario, the defendants are left without any assurance that a judgment
will be binding because the ultimate preclusive effect of the judgment
is left at the whim of a foreign court.20
American courts have been increasingly sensitive to these res
judicata concerns raised by defendants in transnational class
litigation.2 Thus, prior to certifying a US. class action containing
foreign class members, many courts will analyze whether the "home"
courts of the foreign class members would accord preclusive effect to
an eventual U.S. judgment.22 The more likely the foreign court is to
recognize a US. class judgment, the more likely an American court
will include those foreigners in the U.S. class action." Such an
19. See U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 1.
20. Shapiro & Kim, supra note 14, at 41 ("The possibility of a second action in a US
court after a final determination in a class action is not significant. Once there has been a
final determination, the doctrine of resjudicata bars subsequent actions in US courts. With
non-US class members in a US class action, however, even after a final determination, it is
possible that a non-US citizen could return to his home jurisdiction to commence a redundant
lawsuit because that home jurisdiction may not recognise the validity and binding effect of
the final determination in a US class action.").
21. This presupposes, of course, that courts were aware of the potential issues with
preclusion. In several cases, courts have certified class actions comprised of U.S. and non-
U.S. class members without any discussion of the res judicata issue. See, eg., In re CP Ships
Ltd. Sec. Litig., 578 E3d 1306, 1318 (11th Cir. 2009) (affirming district court's approval of a
securities class action settlement where the class included foreign purchasers of stock of a
foreign corporation), abrogated by Morrison v. Nat'l Austi. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869
(2010); Wagner v. Barrick Gold Corp., 251 ER.D. 112, 120-21 (S.D.N.Y 2008) (certifying a
plaintiff class including Canadian investors who purchased stock on the Toronto Stock
Exchange and concluding it had subject matter jurisdiction over the Canadian investors'
claims); In re Flag Telecom Holdings Ltd. Sec. Litig., 245 ER.D. 147, 174 (S.D.N.Y 2007)
(certifying a class that included foreign investors who purchased stock of Flag Telecom
Holdings, Ltd. on the London Stock Exchange), affdinpart vacated inpart, 574 E3d 29 (2d
Cir. 2009); In reAshanti Goldfields Sec. Litig., No. CV 00-0717(DGT), 2004 WL 626810, at
*18 (E.D.N.Y Mar. 30, 2004) (certifying a class that included foreign investors who
purchased shares of a foreign corporation on the New York Stock Exchange); In re Nortel
Networks Corp. Sec. Litig., No. 01 Civ. 1855(RMB), 2003 WL 22077464, at *7-8 & n.7
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 8, 2003) (certifying a class that included Canadian investors who purchased
stock of a Canadian corporation on the Toronto Stock Exchange); In re Gaming Lottery Sec.
Litig., 58 F. Supp. 2d 62, 77 (S.D.N.Y 1999) (same); In re Pizza Time Theatre Sec. Litig., 112
ER.D. 15, 17, 22 (N.D. Cal. 1986) (certifying transnational class action that included
claimants from fifteen foreign countries).
22. I use the term "judgment" in this Article to denote both a judgment on the merits
or a settlement that has been given judicial approval.
23. Note that this approach appears to have some international acceptance. See, e.g.,
Int'l Bar Ass'n Legal Practice Div., Guidelines for Recognisng and Enforcing Foreign
Judgments for Collective Redress (Oct. 16, 2008), available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/
consultations/20 11_collective_redress/ibaguidelines.en.pdf ("It is appropriate for a court to
assume jurisdiction over foreign class members if the court has subject matter jurisdiction
over the claim and it is reasonable for the court to expect that its judgment will be given
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analysis typically takes place under Rule 23's "superiority" criterion2 4
that requires a plaintiff seeking to have a class action certified under
Rule 23(b)(3) to establish "that a class action is superior to other
available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the
controversy."25 Under this analysis, it is thought that if a foreign court
preclusive effect by the jurisdictions in which the foreign class members not specifically
named in the proceedings would ordinarily seek redress.").
24. Sometimes, the res judicata issue is discussed under the rubric of forum non
conveniens and/or comity. See In reAir Cargo Shipping Serys. Antitrust Litig., No. MD 06-
1775(JG)(VVP), 2008 WL 5958061, at *24, *43-44 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2008) (granting
defendants' motion to dismiss on forum non conveniens and international comity grounds
because claims in an antitrust action were brought "by largely foreign plaintiffs, against
largely foreign defendants, arising out of events occurring abroad"); Warlop v. Lemout, 473 F.
Supp. 2d 260, 263-65 (D. Mass. 2007) (granting defendants' motion to dismiss a securities
class action on forum non conveniens grounds where the class included mostly foreign
investors who purchased stock of a Belgian corporation on the European Stock Exchange); In
re Assicurazioni Generali S.EA. Holocaust Ins. Litig., 228 E Supp. 2d 348, 363, 375
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (denying European insurance companies' motion to dismiss consolidated
breach of contract class actions, noting that it was too early in the litigation to give potential
res judicata concerns great weight in the forum non convemens inquiry); Del Fierro v.
Pepsico Int'l, 897 F Supp. 59, 63-64 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (granting defendants' motion to dismiss
a class action brought by a Filipino resident for conduct allegedly occurring in the Philippines
on forum non conveniens grounds in part based on res judicata concerns). Note also that the
res judicata issue is sometimes raised in connection with lead plaintiff status in transnational
securities class actions. See Buettgen v. Harless, 263 ER.D. 378, 382-83 (N.D. Tex. 2009)
(ruling on competing motions to be appointed as lead plaintiff in a securities class action, the
court held that because there was no treaty between the United States and Switzerland with
respect to recognition and enforcement, Swiss investment group would possibly be subject to
res judicata defense and therefore refused to appoint Swiss investment group as lead
plaintifi); Mohanty v. Bigband Networks, Inc., No. C 07-5 101 SBA, 2008 WL 426250, at *7-
8, *10 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2008) (appointing as lead plaintiff in a securities class action a
British citizen residing in the Republic of Cyprus over another plaintiff's objection that the
British citizen was an inadequate lead plaintiff because a U.S. class action judgment would
not be given preclusive effect in Cyprus); Marsden v. Select Med. Corp., 246 ER.D. 480, 486,
490 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (certifying a class and appointing as a lead plaintiff an Austrian
investment manager who purchased stock of an American company on the New York Stock
Exchange despite defendants' concerns that a U.S. class action judgment would not be given
preclusive effect by Austrian courts); In re Molson Coors Brewing Co. Sec. Litig., 233 ER.D.
147, 153 (D. Del. 2005) (appointing a German investment manager as lead plaintiff in a
securities class action lawsuit over objections by another plaintiff that the German investment
manager would not be an ideal choice for lead plaintiff because of, among other things, the
possibility that a judgment against the German investment manager may not be given
preclusive effect in Germany); Takeda v. Turbodyne Techs., Inc., 67 E Supp. 2d 1129, 1138-
39 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (granting motion to appoint as lead plaintiff in a securities class action a
group of American and German investors who purchased stock of an American corporation
over objection that it would be improvident to appoint a group that contained German
investors as lead plaintiff because a German court may not recognize and give preclusive
effect to a U.S. class action judgment).
25. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). The rule states:
The matters pertinent to these findings include:
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is not likely to accord preclusive effect to a U.S. class judgment, then
the U.S. class action device is not a "superior" method of adjudicating
the controversy in respect of those foreign claims.26 American courts
have used this method of analysis primarily in securities fraud cases,
but also in a variety of other substantive areas including product
liability, mass torts, antitrust, consumer protection, and breach of
contract.27
(A) the class members' interests in individually controlling the prosecution or
defense of separate actions;
(B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already
begun by or against class members;
(C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims
in the particular forum; and
(D) the likely difficulties in managing a class action.
Id With transnational classes, factors (C) and (D) are the most pertinent to the analysis.
26. Bermann, supra note 1, at 95 ("Interestingly, not one U.S. court (and there have
been many) that has faced this issue has taken this easy way out. Rather, courts have made
the 'recognizability' of the eventual U.S. class action judgment a central consideration in
determining whether the class action is indeed a 'superior' vehicle for adjudicating the
controversy, within the meaning of Rule 23(b). That fact alone is worth noting for, in itself, it
reveals a profound sensitivity to the delicacy of multinational class actions.").
27. Transnational securities class actions have garnered attention as of late owing to
the recent spate of "foreign-cubed" or "f-cubed" class actions in U.S. federal courts. F-cubed
actions are those brought under U.S. securities laws by foreign plaintiffs who purchased or
sold securities from a forvign issuer on a foreign stock exchange. Defendants resisting
certification of an f-cubed class action have tended to argue that U.S. courts lack subject-
matter jurisdiction over foreign claims brought by foreign plaintiffs under either the
"conduct" or "effects" test (or some "admixture" of both). See Buxbaum, supra note 6; Kun
Young Chang, Multinational Enforcement of US. Securities Laws: The Need for the Clear
and Restrained Scope of Extaterritonial Subject-Matter Jurisdiction, 9 FORDHAM J. CORP. &
FIN. L. 89 (2003); Choi & Silberman, supra note 6; Erez Reuveni, Extrateitoriality As
Standing: A Standing Theory of the Extratenitorial Application of the Securties Laws, 43
UC. DAvis L. REv. 1071 (2010); Julie B. Rubenstein, Note, Fraud on the GlobalMarket: US.
Courts Don't Buy It Subject-Matter Judsdiction in F-Cubed Securities Class Actions, 95
CORNELL L. REv. 627 (2010).
In Morrison v NationalAustralia Bank Ltd, 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010), the United States
Supreme Court was faced with the issue of whether section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 provided a cause of action to foreign plaintiffs suing both American and foreign
defendants for fraud in connection with securities traded on foreign exchanges. The Court
held that the question was not one of subject matter jurisdiction, but one related to merits. Id.
at 2877. Applying the "longstanding principle ... that legislation of Congress ... appl[ies]
only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States," unless a contrary intent appears,
the Supreme Court held that because section 10(b) is silent regarding its extraterritorial
application, the section has no application outside the United States. Id at 2877-78 (internal
quotation marks omitted). The Court then enunciated a "transactional test" for defining the
reach of federal securities laws: U.S. federal securities laws will apply when "the purchase or
sale is made in the United States, or involves a security listed on a domestic exchange." Id. at
2886.
While Morson has significantly reduced the universe of transnational securities class
actions, the case has not foreclosed transnational securities class actions outright. Foreign
plaintiffs can still be included in 10(b)(5) securities class actions provided that the Supreme
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While most courts have considered the ultimate enforceability of
a U.S. class judgment as relevant to the certification analysis, they have
been divided on the standard to apply in assessing res judicata
concerns. At present, there is no clear consensus as to the weight
courts will accord to concerns about the preclusive effect of a U.S.
judgment abroad. In fact, one district court has referred to the courts'
assessment of the res judicata issue in transnational class actions as
"haphazard."" The varying approaches adopted by courts evidence a
Court's new "transactional test" is satisfied. Thus, as. long as a foreign claimant makes a
"purchase or sale .. . in the United States" or the transaction "involves a security listed on a
domestic exchange," U.S. securities laws do not operate extraterritorially, and the foreign
claimant can be included in an American class action. See id.; see also Horatia Muir Watt, A
"View from Across" (in the Other Direction), CONFLICT OF LAWS.NET (July 1, 2010), http://
conflictoflaws.net/2010/a-"view-from-across"-in-the-other-direction/ ("[The Morrison decision]
is not necessarily going to ... prevent trans-Atlantic class actions including European
investors as claimants or European firms as defendants, as long as the new transactional
criteria are satisfied."). Thus, while a particularly problematic species of transnational class
actions (the f-cubed securities class action) is now rendered impermissible under Morison,
transnational class actions in the securities context will continue to exist. Indeed, some
commentators believe that Moison may not ultimately prove as restrictive as it appears. For
instance, some argue that the second prong of the transactional test is nebulous and may
eventually be interpreted expansively to provide for the inclusion of foreign plaintiffs in U.S.
class actions. See, e.g., Margaret Sachs, International Secuities Fraud Makes Supreme Court
Debut, OPINlo Julus (June 25, 2010, 11:12 AM), http://opiniojuris.org/2010/06/25/morrison-
and-the-presumption-against-extraterritoriality ("Most likely it is the second prong-
'domestic transactions in other securities'-that will produce trouble. Suppose a foreign
brokerage firm has a US affiliate. If the foreign brokerage firm receives an order to trade
from a foreign investor and executes the trade in the US through the US affiliate, does the
trade qualify as a domestic transaction?"). Moreover, it is predicted that resourceful
plaintiffs' attorneys will find ways to circumvent the Monison ruling. In the words of one
commentator:
Some possible ways it might be circumvented include filing individual lawsuits in
state court under state law, and filing federal court class actions alleging state law
violations. Claimants in these kinds of cases arguably may face the same hurdles
of trying to show that the relevant law provides remedies regarding securities
transactions on foreign exchanges, but the existence of U.S.-based fraudulent
conduct potentially could provide a sufficient basis for relief under many legal
theories, even if not under the federal securities laws.
Kevin LaCroix, More Thoughts About Morrison v. National Australia Bank, THE D & 0
DIARY (June 28, 2010, 4:11 AM), http://www.dandodiary.com/2010/06/articles/securities-
litigation/more-thoughts-about-morrison-v-national-australia-bank. In light of the interpre-
tative challenges ahead and the creativity of the plaintiffs' bar, it would be unwise to believe
that transnational securities class actions will simply fall by the wayside. Thus, we can expect
that in securities class actions-as in other substantive areas such as product liability,
consumer protection, and antitrust--courts will still need to grapple with the issue of how the
presence of foreign claimants impacts the certification analysis. See also Wasserman, supra
note 7, at 314 ("In short, even after Momison, class counsel are likely to keep filing
transnational class actions and defense counsel are likely to keep opposing them.").
28. In reVivendi Universal, S.A. Sec. Litig. ( VivendiI), 242 ER.D. 76, 93 (S.D.N.Y.
2007).
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great deal of confusion about the framework within which to conduct
the res judicata analysis. Nonetheless, it is possible to group the
approaches into the following general categories: the "near certainty"
approach, the "probability" standard, the "evidentiary value" approach,
and the "nonstandard."29
A. The 'Near Certainty"Approach
The first case to consider this issue in any depth was Bersch v
Drexel Festone, Inc., a securities action brought on behalf of a class
of domestic and foreign purchasers of stock in a Swiss-based
Canadian corporation.30 The Bersch court, in refusing to certify the
class, expressed concerns about "the serious problem ... of the
dubious binding effect of a defendants' [sic] judgment (or a possibly
inadequate plaintiff's judgment) on absent foreign plaintiffs [and] the
propriety of purporting to bind such plaintiffs by a settlement."" The
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ultimately
concluded that while an American court does not need to abstain from
entering judgment when there is a possibility that a foreign court may
not recognize it, the situation is different when nonrecognition is a near
certaity32 The court elaborated:
This point must be considered not simply in the halcyon context of a
large recovery which plaintiff visualizes but in those of a judgment for
the defendants or a plaintiffs' judgment or a settlement deemed to be
inadequate. As Judge Frankel stated in his order permitting the case to
proceed as a class action: if defendants prevail against a class they are
entitled to a victory no less broad than a defeat would have been.3
Bersch is thus credited with articulating the "near certainty" test
for evaluating the res judicata effect of a U.S. class judgment:
American courts should not certify (and thus, should not adjudicate)
29. Notably, most of these approaches were developed in the context of "f-cubed"
class actions, which were recently rendered impermissible by the Supreme Court in
Morrison. See 130 S. Ct. at 2886. The approaches to res judicata, however, exist
independently of the underlying cause of action.
30. 519 F.2d 974, 978 (2d Cir. 1975), abrogated by Morison, 130 S. Ct. 2869. The
proposed class included approximately 50,000 purchasers, of whom 386 were American and
the balance of whom were "citizens and residents of Canada, Australia, England, France,
Germany, Switzerland, and many other countries in Europe, Asia, Africa, and South
America." Id. at 977-78 & n.2.
31. In addition to the res judicata issues, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the foreign purchasers'
claims. Id. at 986-87.
32. Id at 996.
33. Id
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claims involving foreign class members where nonrecognition of an
eventual judgment by a foreign court is a "near certainty." Despite the
fact that this standard has been called into question because of the
difficulty of establishing a "near certainty" of nonrecognition, many
courts continue to apply it in assessing res judicata concerns. 34
B. 'More Likely Than Not" or '"robability" Standard
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York in In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Securities Litdgation took a
decidedly more nuanced approach to the res judicata issue." Vivendi
involved a securities fraud class action brought against a French-based
defendant on behalf of a worldwide class of all persons who purchased
or acquired the defendant's common stock or American Depository
Shares during the proposed class period. Approximately twenty-five
percent of the shares in question were held by American shareholders,
while thirty-seven percent of the shares were held by French
shareholders. The remainder of the defendant's shares were held
predominantly by other European persons or entities." In opposing the
motion for class certification, the defendant argued that the foreign
plaintiffs should be excluded from the class definition because of the
"near certainty" that the defendant would be unable to assert claim
34. Other cases that appear to have adopted this approach include: In re Royal
Dutch/Shell Transp. Sec. Litig., 380 E Supp. 2d 509, 546-47, 573 (D.N.J. 2005) (denying
defendants' motion to dismiss a securities class action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
with respect to claims brought by foreign investors who purchased stock of an English and
Dutch corporation on foreign exchanges over defendants' objections that a foreign court
would not recognize and give preclusive effect to a U.S. class action judgment); In re Cable &
Wireless, PLC, Sec. Litig., 321 F. Supp. 2d 749, 755, 766 (E.D. Va. 2004) (holding that the
court had subject matter jurisdiction over claims brought by Canadian investors who
purchased stock of a British corporation on the London Stock Exchange because, inter alia,
defendants failed to show that nonrecognition of a U.S. class action judgment by an English
court would be a near certainty); In reTelectronics Pacing Sys., Inc., No. MDL-1057, 1996
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11088, at *3-5 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 22, 1996) (granting defendant's motion to
decertify a class with respect to foreign members of the class under Bemch's "near certainty"
standard because defendant submitted uncontested affidavits showing that a U.S. class action
judgment would not be recognized and given preclusive effect in several foreign
jurisdictions), revU on other grounds, 221 E3d 870 (6th Cir, 2000); Jordan v. Global Natural
Res., Inc., 102 ER.D. 45, 52 (S.D. Ohio 1984) (certifying a class that included foreign
purchasers of stock of a British corporation despite defendant's argument that a U.S. class
action judgment would not be given preclusive effect by foreign courts on the basis that the
"standard for ... abstention [from entering judgment] is 'near certainty"').
35. Vivendil, 242 ER.D. 76 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
36. Id. at 81 ("During this time, virtually all of Vivendi's ADSs-which traded on the
NYSE-were held by persons or entities in North America, while virtually all of Vivendi's
ordinary shares-traded predominantly on the Paris Bourse-were held by persons or entities
outside the United States, predominantly in France and the rest of Europe.").
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preclusion as a bar to subsequent litigation in France and other
European countries."
Although the defendant did not frame it as such, the court
considered the res judicata argument under Rule 23's superiority
requirement." The court indicated that it did not find the Bersch "near
certainty" standard to be a "particularly useful analytical tool.""
Rather, the court considered it more appropriate to evaluate the risk of
nonrecognition of a U.S. class judgment along a continuum. The court
emphasized that the superiority requirement of Rule 23 will be
satisfied "[w]here plaintiffs are able to establish a probability that a
foreign court will recognize the res judicata effect of a U.S. class action
judgment."40 Conversely, where plaintiffs are unable to demonstrate
that a foreign court is "more likely than not" to recognize a US. class
judgment, this factor-considered alongside other factors-may lead
to the exclusion of foreign claimants from the class.4' In short, "The
closer the likelihood of non-recognition is to being a 'near certainty,'
the more appropriate it is for the Court to deny certification of foreign
claimants."'2
The Vivend court was clear to indicate that res judicata concerns
alone should not be dispositive of the superiority issue.43 Rather,
courts should assess res judicata concerns alongside "other factors"
that typically impact the superiority analysis." Ultimately, after
reviewing volumes of expert testimony on the likelihood of
nonrecognition in plaintiffs' home jurisdictions, the court concluded
that French, English, and Dutch investors could be part of the class
because it was "more likely than not" that their respective countries
would accord preclusive effect to a U.S. class judgment.45 Conversely,
German and Austrian plaintiffs would be excluded from the class
because it was probable that their respective courts would not give res
judicata effect to a U.S. opt-out class judgment.4 Several courts post-
37. Id. at 92.
38. Id. ("Although defendants do not consistently characterize their argument as such,
the Court will consider this aspect of their opposition to be an attack on the superiority of
class action treatment of the claims of foreign purchasers.").
39. Id. at 95.
40. Id.
41. Id
42. Id.
43. Id
44. Id
45. Id. at 105.
46. Id at 105-06. For subsequent developments in the case, see Choi & Silberman,
supra note 6, at 480 ("Defendants sought to appeal the certification issue via an FRCP 23(f)
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Vivendi have employed its probability of recognition standard in
assessing whether a foreign court would likely grant res judicata effect
to a U.S. class judgment.47
C "Evidentiry Value" or "Substantial Effect" in Foreign Court
A few courts have used an approach to the res judicata issue in
transnational class actions that examines whether a U.S. class
judgment would have any sort of effect or evidentiary value abroad. In
short, these cases do not apply a definitive standard, so much as they
look at the general question: Will a U.S. judgment matter to a foreign
court?
In In re Turkeell Iletishn HjznetleE A.S. Secunties Litigation,
plaintiffs sought to certify a class action comprised of a group of
domestic and foreign shareholders who had purchased the American
Depository Shares issued by a Turkish defendant pursuant to a
registration statement.48 The defendants in Turkcell argued that class
certification was improper because, inter alia, "the Turkish courts do
not recognize class actions." The Southern District of New York
rejected the defendants' argument, stating that "[t]he case law suggests
that, if there is some possibility that a class action judgment would be
enforceable-or at least have some substantial effect--in the foreign
jurisdiction at issue, then class certification is proper."" The Turkcell
court ultimately held that based on the affidavit evidence, it could not
"conclude that a Turkish court would give no weight to a judgment of
motion, requesting clarification of the appropriate standard for assessing the relationship
between the requirement of res judicata and the determination of class-action superiority
under FRCP 23(b)(3). Specifically, defendants challenged the 'more likely than not' standard
and argued that the lack of 'preclusion protection' amounted to a due process violation. The
Second Circuit refised to hear the appeal, and defendants then sought certiorari in the
Supreme Court which was denied."). In early 2011, the Vivendi court modified the class
definition in light of Mornison v NationalAustraia Bank Ltd. See In re Vivendi Universal,
S.A. Sec. Litig. ( Vivendll), 765 F. Supp. 2d 512, 533-34 (S.D.N.Y 2011). Specifically, the
court has excluded from the class Americans and foreigners who purchased Vivendi ordinary
shares on foreign markets because such purchasers cannot satisfy Morrison's "transactional
test." Id. However, the court explained that "[t]he class going forward shall consist of all
persons from the United States, France, England and the Netherlands who purchased or
otherwise acquired Vivendi [American Depository Receipts]" on the New York Stock
Exchange during the class period. Id. Therefore, as some foreign purchasers remain in the
class after Morrison, Vivendi's res judicata analysis has not been affected by Morison.
47. See, eg., In rAlstom SA Sec. Litig., 253 ER.D. 266, 282 (S.D.N.Y 2008) ("The
Court finds that the Probability Standard is appropriate.").
48. 209 F.R.D. 353, 354 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
49. Id. at 360.
50. Id. (emphasis added).
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this court."" Accordingly, the court proceeded to certify a class that
included foreign claimants.52
The Southern District of New York in In re Lloydk Ameican
Trust Fund Litigation also took an approach to the res judicata issue
that did not focus specifically on a discrete standard to be applied, but
rather looked at whether the U.S. class litigation would be of
evidentiary value abroad." In Lloyd, plaintiffs sought to certify a
class of approximately 1700 current and former beneficiaries of trust
funds held by the defendant in an action for breach of fiduciary duty in
a case where approximately two-thirds of the proposed plaintiff class
resided outside the United States.' In opposing class certification, the
defendants argued that a class action should not be certified because
foreign class members would not be precluded from relitigating claims
in their home jurisdictions." Plaintiffs, on the other hand, argued that a
class action was superior to other methods of adjudication because a
class judgment would "have evidentiary value in any subsequent
proceedings in foreign courts."" The court in Lloydk appeared to
accept this "evidentiary value" approach, reasoning that "[defendants']
affidavits regarding foreign law do not compel the conclusion that a
judgment in the United States would have no value in a foreign court"
and that "a foreign court may look to the results achieved here for
guidance."" Thus, both Turkcell and Lloydk seem to suggest that, as
long as a U.S. class judgment would in some way be meaningful to a
foreign court, this militates in favor of a finding of superiority.
D. The 'Nonstandard'" Recognition ofRes Judicata Issue
A final category of cases considering res judicata in transnational
class actions appears to apply what might be considered a
"nonstandard" to the assessment of the issue. That is, several courts
have recognized that there may ultimately be preclusion issues
associated with the inclusion of foreign plaintiffs in U.S. class actions
but do not provide any guidance on how to deal with res judicata
51. Id. Note that the U.S. court appeared to have misunderstood the res judicata issue
when it stated, "We cannot expect the many American investors who are members of the class
to pursue independent actions in Turkey." Id. at 361. The concern should have been that
absent Turkish class members would pursue subsequent actions in Turkey. See id
52. Id.
53. No. 96 CIV 1262(RWS), 1998 WL 50211, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 1998).
54. Id at *5.
55. Id at * 15.
56. Id
57. Id
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concerns. For instance, in In re US. Financial Secuides Ligation,
the United States District Court for the Southern District of California
noted, "Although the resjudicata problem is one factor to consider ...
it should not be used to deny [class certification] especially when [the
court] otherwise has subject matter jurisdiction."" Thus, these courts
appear to look at res judicata concerns alongside all the other elements
of the litigation to determine whether or not to include foreign
claimants in the class."
While most courts recognize res judicata concerns as relevant to
the certification analysis-in particular, the superiority prong of Rule
23-they are sharply divided on the standard that a plaintiff must
satisfy in convincing a court that it is appropriate to include foreign
claimants within the class. The obvious implication of the application
of such disparate standards to the superiority analysis is that
differential treatment is accorded to similarly situated foreign
claimants. Courts using the "near certainty" approach are likely to
include foreign claimants in a U.S. class action because it will be
difficult to establish that nonrecognition in a foreign jurisdiction is a
near certainty. Those same foreign claimants, however, are less likely
to be included in a U.S. class action under a "probability" or
"evidentiary value" standard. Under this latter standard, plaintiffs may
be unable to show that a foreign court will "more likely than not"
enforce a U.S. class judgment. Consequently, the inclusion or
exclusion of a foreign claimant will often turn on nothing more than
the particular standard chosen by a U.S. court in evaluating res judicata
concerns.
At a more fundamental level, however, regardless of which
approach is used, the underlying assumption is that the res judicata
effect of a U.S. class judgment is knowable to a court in advance. That
is, the tests hinge on the idea that it is, in fact, possible to predict with a
58. 69 F.R.D. 24, 50 (S.D. Cal. 1975).
59. For other cases where the res judicata issue is raised as a general concern, but not
dealt with in any depth, see In re Infineon Techs. AG Sec. Litig., 266 F.R.D. 386, 392-93,
397-98 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (certifying a class where ninety percent of the class members resided
in Germany and Italy and expressly declining "to speculate as to the preclusive effect" of a
U.S. class action judgment abroad); Steinberg v. Ericsson LM Tel. Co., No. 07 Civ.
9615(RPP), 2008 WL 1721484, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 11, 2008) (denying a motion for
reconsideration of its earlier ruling declining to appoint as lead plaintiff a group of foreign
investors who purchased stock on foreign exchanges because of, among other things, res
judicata concerns); In ir Activision Sec. Litig., 621 F. Supp. 415, 432 (N.D. Cal. 1985)
(certifying a class consisting of some foreign purchasers of stock of an American corporation
and noting that "[i]n the absence of further information, defendants' argument will not
prevent certification of a class including the foreign purchasers").
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measure of certainty the preclusive effect of a U.S. class action
judgment in a foreign jurisdiction. In the next Part, I call into doubt
this assumption and argue that the practice of speculating as to the res
judicata effect of an eventual U.S. class judgment is misguided and
should be abandoned. This will set the stage for the discussion in Part
IV advocating that courts employ an opt-in model for foreign
claimants in order to minimize the res judicata problems that
characterize transnational class actions.
III. THE ILLUSORY SEARCH FOR RES JUDICATA
American courts have generally been responsive to the due
process concerns raised by defendants resisting the certification of
transnational class actions. Consequently, they have developed a
nuanced approach to the res judicata issue which examines what effect
a foreign court would give to a U.S. class judgment purporting to bind
foreign absent class members. However, this res judicata analysis is
only a "solution" to the due process problems inherent in transnational
class actions if U.S. courts are able to predict accurately the preclusive
effect of an eventual class judgment."o In other words, it only makes
sense to condition the superiority analysis in transnational class
litigation on the eventual res judicata effect of a U.S. class judgment
abroad if that res judicata effect were indeed knowable to a U.S. court
ex ante. It is submitted, however, that US. courts are not positioned to
predict accurately the preclusive effect of U.S. class judgments abroad
owing to both the litigation and structural dynamics of class
proceedings. As such, the search for the res judicata effect of a U.S.
class judgment is nothing short of illusory.
A. Litigation Restrictions on the Search for Res Judicata
Certain litigation dynamics interfere with the ability of a court to
assess and predict correctly the res judicata effect of a U.S. class
judgment in a foreign court. In particular, the process of proving
foreign law via experts, the principle of party prosecution, and the
litigation posture of the action complicate the transnational class action
landscape and prevent a court from accurately analyzing the res
judicata issues at play.
60. Note that the issue can also be perceived as a due process issue for absent foreign
class members. See Debra Lyn Bassett, Implied "Consent" to Personal Judsdiction in
Transnational Class Litigation, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REv. 619, 624-25; ipfa Part IVC.2.
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1. Foreign Law Proved by Experts
Although the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that a
court may consider "any relevant material or source" in ascertaining
foreign law," courts generally rely on experts in determining whether a
foreign court would grant preclusive effect to a U.S. judgment.62
Consequently, parties on both sides of the certification motion tend to
adduce expert evidence-usually in the form of expert declarations or
expert affidavits-on the likelihood that a foreign court would grant
preclusive effect to a judgment in a U.S. class action containing foreign
nationals. The use of experts to assist a court in ascertaining the
eventual res judicata effect of a U.S. class judgment raises several
interrelated concerns that ultimately call into question the propriety of
courts looking to foreign preclusion law as a component of the
domestic Rule 23 superiority analysis.
First, the process of ascertaining foreign law on preclusion via
conflicting expert affidavits is cumbersome. Notably, U.S. courts will
conduct a country-by-country analysis and consider the testimony of
multiple expert witnesses in order to predict the eventual res judicata
effect that will be accorded to a U.S. class judgment abroad. George
Bermann describes the process in reference to the recent case of In re
Royal Dutch/Shell Transport Secwities Ligation" as follows:
[T]he federal district court examined the likely fate of a future U.S.
class action judgment in no fewer than eight foreign jurisdictions, with
each side in the dispute proffering opinions and reply opinions by
foreign country experts on the question. As the analysis was conducted
on a country-by-country basis, it resulted in thirty-two separate
opinions in all, with no two countries taking exactly the same position
for the same reasons and, thus, leading the court to appoint two
opposing "super synthetic experts" who could somehow make sense of
the whole. 4
61. FED. R. Civ. P 44.1 ("In determining foreign law, the court may consider any
relevant material or source, including testimony, whether or not submitted by a party or
admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence."). The advisory committee notes further
elaborate: "In further recognition of the peculiar nature of the issue of foreign law, the new
rule provides that in determining this law the court is not limited by material presented by the
parties; it may engage in its own research and consider any relevant material thus found."
FED. R. Civ P. 44.1 advisory committee's notes.
62. See, e.g., In re Alstom SA Sec. Litig., 253 F.R.D. 266, 287, 289-91 (S.D.N.Y.
2008); Vivendil, 242 F.R.D. 76, 95-96 & n.12 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); In re U.S. Fin. Sec. Litig., 69
F.R.D. 24, 48-49 & n.19 (S.D. Cal. 1975).
63. 522 E Supp. 2d 712 (D.N.J. 2007).
64. Bermann, supra note 1, at 100 (footnote omitted); see also Choi & Silberman,
supra note 6, at 480 ("Nonetheless, several courts have expressed concern with that issue [of
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It has become routine in transnational class actions for scores of
experts to opine as to the res judicata issue. In the Vivendi case, for
instance, the Southern District of New York considered testimony from
over a dozen different experts or groups of experts on the question of
class action recognition in France alone." In US. Fhancial, the
Southern District of California referred to the "multitude" of affidavits
submitted to the court concerning the enforcement laws of France,
West Germany, Luxembourg, Norway, Great Britain, Belgium,
Switzerland, and Italy.66 Similarly, in In re Alstom SA Secwities
Litigation, the Southern District of New York considered in detail
submissions from various experts on the recognition laws of England,
the Netherlands, Canada, and France." Based on the volume of expert
evidence and complexity of the recognition analysis, it is no wonder
that courts are, in Bermann's words, struggling to "make sense of the
whole."' The inevitable by-product of ascertaining foreign law in this
manner is the proverbial battle of the experts." One commentator
astutely notes, "[I]t is remarkable to see that in the very same
procedure and concerning the very same country, the experts will
diverge considerably in their views."o Courts are left with few
definitive answers other than "maybe." 1
Second, one must bear in mind that expert witnesses are
necessarily partisan-that is, either the plaintiff or defendant solicits
res judicata], and the result has been elaborate expert reports (and subsequent law-review
articles by those experts) detailing the likelihood of enforcement of such a judgment in
various countries.").
65. Viven di1, 242 F.R.D. at 95-96 n.12.
66. 69 F.R.D. at 48 & n.19.
67. 253 F.R.D. at 287, 289-91.
68. Bermann, supro note 1, at 100.
69. Arguably, the problem could be alleviated to some extent by courts appointing
special masters to report on foreign law. See FED. R. CIv. P. 53. While this may be a "fix" to
the "battle of the experts" problem, it still does not change the fact that the special master
would be attempting to predict that which is incapable of being predicted: whether a foreign
court at some later point in time would accord preclusive effect to a U.S. judgment or
settlement that is not yet in existence. See infa Part III.B.
70. Andrea Pinna, Recognition and Res Judicata of US Class Action Judgments in
European Legal Systems, I ERASMUS L. REV. 31, 39 (2008).
71. One commentator is of the view that courts are making "no effort to thoroughly
analyze the expert opinions." See Matthew H. Jasilli, Note, A Rat Res? Questioning the
Value ofRes Judicata in Rule 23(b)(3) Superority Inquiries for Foreign Cubed Class Action
Securities Litigations, 48 COLUM J. TRANSNAT'L L. 114, 129, 131 (2009). Speaking
specifically of the Vivendicase, he notes, "The opinion contains little more than laundry lists
of assertions by experts. The court barely goes beyond noting the inconsistencies and
disagreements among the experts. . . ." Id at 129.
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them to opine as to a certain state of affairs. In this respect, Judge
Posner states:
Lawyers who testify to the meaning of foreign law, whether they are
practitioners or professors, are paid for their testimony and selected on
the basis of the convergence of their views with the litigating position of
the client, or their willingness to fall in with the views urged upon them
by the client. These are the banes of expert testimony.72
Given that experts are paid for their testimony, one might
question both the helpfulness and reliability of the expert opinion.
Judge Easterbrook, for instance, notes that given the partisan nature of
expert testimony, courts must "discount" the expert's testimony to
account for its adversarial spin.74
72. Bodun USA, Inc. v. La Cafetiere, Inc., 621 F.3d 624, 633 (7th Cir. 2010) (Posner,
J., concurring).
73. Note that the defendants in Royal Ahold critiqued the plaintiff's expert, Professor
Smit, on the basis that he was not opining as to what the law was, but rather what the law
should be-
Rather than analyze existing law, Professor Smit makes legislative and
policy arguments as to what he believes should be the law in foreign jurisdictions.
The Smit Declaration is peppered with policy statements such as: a "judgment
favorable to the class would secure for Dutch shareholders benefits that are judged
desirable and appropriate"; "class actions are a significant benefit for society at
large"; there is "intrinsic fairness to shareholders to receive the benefits from a
class action if they so desire"; and that class actions serve "universally recognized
desirable social goals". Smit's subjective and unsupported opinions about class
actions are, in fact, directly contrary to the views of the foreign jurisdictions at
issue here. In any event, this Court is not tasked with determining whether
inclusion of foreign investors is somehow "[t]he sensible solution", but rather what
is the law of the foreign jurisdictions.
Memorandum of Law of Royal Ahold N.V & U.S. Foodservice, Inc. in Opposition to Lead
Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification at 28, In re Royal Ahold Sec. & "ERISA" Litig.,
No. Civ. 03-MD-1539-CCB, 2006 WL 132080 (D. Md. Nov. 4, 2005) [hereinafter Memo in
Opposition] (citations omitted).
74. Bodum USA, 621 E3d at 629. In some cases, parties submit affidavits from
stakeholders in the litigation. As with paid experts, the testimony of these parties must
account for the particular agenda the stakeholder is attempting to advance. For instance, on
the motion for reconsideration of the certification decision in the Vivendi case, defendants
adduced submissions from members of the French Ministry of Justice, the former Minister of
Justice, a French business organization, and the President of the French Chamber of
Commerce. In reVivendi Universal, S.A. Sec. Litig. (Vivendill), No. 02 Civ. 5571(RJH)
(HBP), 2009 WL 855799, at *4-6 (S.D.N.Y Mar. 31, 2009). Not surprisingly, each of these
submissions was not receptive to the possibility that French courts would recognize U.S. class
actions containing French nationals as absent class members. See id Also, compounding
this "spin" problem is the fact that frequently some or all of the relevant source materials on
judgment recognition abroad are in languages other than English. Therefore, a court is
oftentimes doubly reliant on paid experts: first, for the literal translation of the documents
and second, for their legal meaning.
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Third, adding to the complication is the fact that a court's
findings on the res judicata issue do not carry precedential value.
They are not, in other words, subject to the doctrine of stare decisis.
As such, it is entirely possible that based on expert testimony, courts
will come to conflicting decisions as to the res judicata effect of a U.S.
transnational class judgment in a foreign court. This is precisely what
happened in the Vivend and Aistom cases decided by the Southern
District of New York only months apart. In Vivend, the court
thoroughly canvassed French law on the res judicata issue and
concluded that it was more likely than not that a French court would
recognize a U.S. class judgment; consequently, French investors were
included in the class." About a year later, the Southern District of New
York decided Alstom, a securities class action involving shares of a
French corporation that were traded on the New York Stock Exchange.
After considering French law and observing that a French court had
not yet determined the extent to which France would recognize a U.S.
class judgment, the court ultimately concluded that the plaintiffs had
not sufficiently demonstrated that French courts would "more likely
than not" recognize and give preclusive effect to a judgment rendered
by a U.S. court." The court acknowledged that it had come to a
different conclusion than the Vivend court and justified the decision
by reference to recent legal developments in France which suggested
that any opt-out mechanism would be contrary to French public
policy." Shortly thereafter, and in light of Aistom, the Vivendi court
was faced with a motion for partial reconsideration of the certification
decision in respect of French shareholders." The defendants argued
that recent developments in France demonstrated that French courts
would not give preclusive effect to a U.S. opt-out class action
judgment, and thus, the U.S. action was not a superior means of
litigating the French shareholders' claims." The court rejected the
75. VvendiI 242 F.R.D. 76, 102, 109 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
76. In reAlstom SA Sec. Litig., 253 F.R.D. 266, 272-73, 287 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
77. Id. at 287 n. 11 ("The Court notes that the Vivend court concluded that a French
court would not find that a United States opt-out class action would violate French public
policy because, at least in part, there was at that time an 'ongoing debate in legal and business
sectors' regarding the possibility of French authorities adopting an opt-out framework.
Vivendi, however, was issued on May 21, 2007, which was prior to the issuance of the
Ministry of Justice Letter, the Constitutional Council's August 16, 2007 decision, and the
Attali Commission's final report in 2008, all of which expressly rejected opt-out mechanisms
of class actions as contrary to French Constitutional principles." (citations omitted)).
78. Viven diII, 2009 WL 855799, at *1.
79. Id. at *3 ("According to defendants a series of 'recent events' in France have 'now
made it clear beyond any doubt' that opt-out class actions are unconstitutional in France, and
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defendant's argument, citing to the recent trend in France and in other
countries to adopt some form of group litigation.o The court
recognized that it had come to a different conclusion than that reached
in Alstom but felt free to do so, noting, "Of fundamental importance to
the Alstrom [sic] decision, however, was the conclusion that this Court
does notdraw, namely, that Decision No. 89-257 holds that a collective
action must provide for each member's individual consent in order to
pass muster under the French Constitution."" Given the inconsistent
and seemingly odd results in Alstom and Vivend, "[b]oth plaintiffs
and defendants are left to speculate as to what the next US court will
conclude would be the most likely outcome in a French court faced
with the question of whether to give the determination of a US court in
a class action case preclusive effect."82
The complicated dynamics surrounding how foreign law is
proved in this context suggest that the practice of attempting to predict
the res judicata effect of U.S. judgments abroad is less than principled.
Stephen Choi and Linda Silberman posit that the current regime leads
to "inconsistent determinations" of class membership depending on an
individual judge's assessment as to whether a foreign country will
recognize a U.S. class judgment with respect to absent claimants."
Thus, the process by which res judicata issues are presented to the
court-by way of partisan, conflicting expert affidavits that are not
subject to the doctrine of stare decisis-should give courts pause about
the appropriateness of looking to foreign preclusion law in the
domestic certification analysis.84
that a French court would never recognize a judgment in this case, since to do so would
violate 'French concepts of international public policy' under Munzer Accordingly,
defendants contend that as far as its French shareholders are concerned, a class action is not a
superior means to achieve the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy." (citation
omitted)).
80. Id. at *7.
81. Id. at *13.
82. Shapiro & Kim, supra note 14, at 43.
83. Choi & Silberman, supmnote 6, at 501-02.
84. One might argue that this "battle of the experts" problem is no different from any
other "battle of the experts" problem in a complicated case. It is suggested, however, that the
problem is more acute in the transnational class context where experts are opining on a
judgment that does not exist, based largely on law that does not exist. Moreover, in other
cases involving expert determinations, the expert opinion is necessary to a ruling on the
merits. Here, the res judicata guesswork is not necessary to a ruling on class certification.
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2. The Principle of Party Prosecution
Another litigation dynamic that impedes the ability of a court to
assess the res judicata effect of a U.S. class judgment stems from the
principle of party prosecution: the idea that it is the parties themselves
who frame the dispute and raise the relevant legal issues. If the parties
do not raise the res judicata "problem," then a court will not usually
consider the issue on its own motion. Consequently, whether
foreigners are included within U.S. class actions may hinge on nothing
more than what particular evidence the parties have submitted to the
court on the res judicata issue.
In several transnational class actions, courts have certified (or
refused to certify) transnational classes based on the failure of one of
the parties to adduce any evidence on the res judicata issue." In
Bersch, for example, the Second Circuit rested its decision not to
certify a class containing foreign plaintiffs in part based on
"uncontradicted affidavits" submitted by the defendants to the effect
that England, Germany, Switzerland, Italy, and France would not grant
preclusive effect to a judgment in favor of the defendant." In Jordan v
Global Natura/ Resources, Inc., on the other hand, it was the defendant
that failed to submit any supporting affidavits attesting to the res
judicata effect of a U.S. judgment abroad." The defendant's failure to
adduce evidence on this point ultimately led the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Ohio to certify a class that included
foreign purchasers of stock of a British corporation." The Bersch and
85. It is unclear why a party would fail to make submissions on this point. However,
one can surmise that perhaps the added cost and/or complexity of the res judicata analysis
would lead one or both parties to avoid the issue. Alternatively, it may be that attorneys in
certain transnational class actions are not familiar with the due process implications of
including foreign claimants within the class. Indeed, although foreign claimants have been
included in American class actions since at least the 1970s, it is only recently that the res
judicata issue has gained some judicial attention, particularly in the securities arena.
86. Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 996-97 (2d Cir. 1975), abrogated
byMorrison v. Nat'l Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010).
87. 102 F.R.D. 45, 52 (S.D. Ohio 1984).
88. Id. ("However, in Bersch, the defendants submitted affidavits in support of their
contention that foreign courts could not recognize a United States judgment. In excluding
foreign purchasers, the Beisch court relied on these affidavits. Unfortunately, we do not have
the assistance of such affidavits." (citation omitted)); see also Marsden v. Select Med. Corp.,
246 F.R.D. 480, 486 (E.D. Pa. 2007) ("Defendants did not consult with experts on Austrian
law to determine the likelihood that an Austrian court would recognize such a claim or fail to
enforce a U.S. judgment in this case, as the parties did in In re Vivendi" (citation omitted));
Wvendil, 242 F.R.D. 76, 105 (S.D.N.Y 2007) (including Dutch shareholders within the class
because defendants have offered no evidence to dispute the affidavit of the plaintiffs' expert
indicating that the enactment of class action legislation in the Netherlands signifies that
recognition of a U.S. class judgment would not be contrary to fundamental principles of
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Jordan cases illustrate that judges' decisions to include or exclude
foreign class members are oftentimes based solely on whether the
parties have turned their minds to the res judicata issue.
In many cases, parties have adduced evidence as to the res
judicata effect of a U.S. class judgment abroad; however, the evidence
is scant or conclusory." In such circumstances, courts have tended to
subscribe to one of two approaches: either they have found the
evidence inadequate to make an informed determination on the res
judicata issue and thus decided the issue on the basis of the standard of
proof, or they have made assumptions and extrapolations based on the
limited evidence presented. In short, in the absence of comprehensive
evidence on the question of whether a foreign court would grant
preclusive effect to a U.S. class judgment, courts have developed what
might be considered either a "restrained" or "activist" approach to the
res judicata issue.
Where a party has not adduced much evidence on the preclusive
effect of a U.S. class judgment in a foreign country, courts adopting a
"restrained" approach have decided the res judicata issue on the basis
of the burden of proof. This is readily apparent in Mohanty v Bigband
Networks, Inc., where the United States District Court for the Northern
District of California noted, "[T]he arguments and evidence presented
by [one of two prospective lead plaintiffs] are a totally inadequate basis
for this Court to form any opinion as to whether Cypriot courts would
give binding effect to this Court's judgments."" Because the court had
"no basis on which to render an informed ruling on this question," it
excluded the Cypriot claimant from lead plaintiff status." Similarly, in
Vivendh, the Southern District of New York noted that the plaintiffs'
fairness in Dutch law.); In re Livent, Inc. Sec. Litig., 78 E Supp. 2d 194, 198, 200, 211, 222
(S.D.N.Y. 1999) (denying defendants' motion to dismiss a securities class action on forum
non conveniens grounds where the action was brought by American and Canadian investors
on behalf of all investors who purchased stock of a Canadian corporation on the NASDAQ or
the Toronto Stock Exchange in part because the defendants did not dispute the affidavit
submitted by the plaintiffs' expert that stated any judgment would be enforceable in Canada);
In re Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc., No. MDL-1057, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11088, at *3-4
(S.D. Ohio Feb. 22, 1996) (decertifying class with respect to foreign members after defendant
presented uncontradicted affidavits showing that the court's judgment would have no
preclusive effect in several foreign jurisdictions), revb 221 E3d 870 (6th Cir. 2000).
89. See, eg., In r Alstom SA Sec. Litig., 253 ER.D. 266, 291 (S.D.N.Y 2008);
Mohanty v. Bigband Networks, Inc., No. C 07-5101 SBA, 2008 WL 426250, at *8 (N.D. Cal.
Feb. 14, 2008).
90. 2008 WL 426250, at *8. Note that the court considered the res judicata issue in
this case as part of its selection in lead plaintiff status in a transnational securities class action.
Id. at *7.
91. Id. at *8.
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expert opinion that "one cannot rule out a U.S. class action settlement
or judgment ... will be recognized or enforced in German [sic]" was
"insufficient on its face," thereby leading the court to conclude that
plaintiffs had not shown a probability that German courts would
accord res judicata effect to a U.S. judgment.92 Thus, even though the
plaintiffs in Mohanty and Viveni submitted some evidence on the res
judicata issue, the court in both cases did not consider the evidence
particularly helpful and thus resolved the issue on the basis of the
burden of proof.
Courts adopting an "activist" approach, on the other hand, have
shown themselves quite willing to extrapolate from limited factual
evidence on the res judicata issue. Nowhere is this clearer than in
Aistom, a transnational securities case involving alleged misrepre-
sentations by a French defendant. In Alstom, the Southern District of
New York was required to decide, inter alia, whether Canadian
claimants should be included in the class of foreign purchasers of the
defendant's stock. According to the defendants, plaintiffs did not carry
their burden of demonstrating that Canadian courts would recognize a
judgment rendered by an American court "because none of the cases
cited by Plaintiffs contain any serious analysis of Canadian judgment-
recognition law and Plaintiffs did not provide any declarations from
Canadian law experts."" Nonetheless, the Alstom court found that
plaintiffs had sufficiently demonstrated that Canadian courts would
likely recognize and give preclusive effect to a class judgment rendered
by an American court. The court was apparently persuaded by the
plaintiffs' argument that a Canadian court would recognize a U.S. class
judgment because "Canadian law recognizes opt-out class actions and
... several courts have certified classes which included Canadians as
lead plaintiffs or class members."94 Thus, despite what appeared to be
a lack of factual evidence on the res judicata issue-especially when
compared to the evidence adduced with respect to French, English,
and Dutch shareholders-the court decided that it was appropriate to
include Canadian shareholders in the class. The decision to do so
appears to have been based on the fact that Canadian law provides for
opt-out class actions domestically and that other U.S. courts have
92. Vivendi I, 242 ER.D. at 105 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
93. Alstom, 253 F.R.D. at 291. The Alstom court acknowledged this issue but based
its holding on other factors.
94. Id at 290-91.
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certified actions containing Canadian class members." Interestingly,
the Alstom court used the limited factual evidence provided by the
parties to include foreign claimants in the class, while the Mohanty
and Vivendi courts used the limited factual evidence to exclude foreign
claimants from the class.
In short, the entire res judicata analysis turns on the nature and
extent of evidence adduced by the parties and what courts ultimately
decide to do with the evidence. Where one of the parties has not
adduced any evidence as to the eventual preclusive effect of a U.S.
judgment, the other side "wins by default." Where some evidence is
submitted on the res judicata issue, whether foreign class members
will be included in a U.S. class action will turn on what evidence is
presented and how willing courts are to extrapolate findings from the
evidence presented. The inherent malleability and subjectivity of the
res judicata inquiry clearly raise concerns about whether courts should
be undertaking this line of inquiry when confronted with the issue of
transnational classes.
3. Litigation Posture: Contested Certification or Settlement
Certification?
Another as-of-yet unexplored facet of the res judicata analysis
stems from the litigation posture of the class action. When a plaintiff
seeks certification of a transnational class action, both parties will
usually have an incentive to raise and adduce evidence on the res
judicata issue. The plaintiff will be inclined to submit evidence on the
issue in order to meet his burden of proof in establishing the
superiority of the class proceeding in respect of foreign claimants. A
larger class of plaintiffs translates into increased settlement leverage
95. See id. The Alstom court also noted:
Furthermore, the Court is not persuaded that a Canadian court would rely on
Article 23 and dismiss any action brought by a Canadian shareholder against
Alstom. With respect to Canadian courts, as opposed to the evidence submitted
regarding English and Dutch law, Defendants have not submitted sufficient
evidence demonstrating that a Canadian court would find Article 23 valid and
binding, thereby requiring dismissal of any case brought by a Canadian shareholder
against Alstom in deference to French courts.
Id. at 291. Article 23 of the Brussels Regulation, dealing with lis pendens, is not applicable
in Canada because Canada is not a signatory to the Brussels Regulation. Council Regulation
44/2001, art. 23, 2000 O.J. (L 012) 1 (EC). That Rule 23 would even be raised by a party, and
entertained by a court, as a potential basis upon which a Canadian court may refuse to
enforce a foreign judgment shows the danger in American courts trying to apply foreign law
in this context.
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and increased fees for class counsel." The defendant also has an
interest in adducing evidence on the res judicata issue. If a defendant
is able to convince a court that the presence of foreign claimants is
problematic under the superiority prong of Rule 23, it may either
defeat certification in its entirety, or at least cut down the geographical
scope of the class." Under either scenario, the defendant benefits: if
certification is defeated because the presence of foreign claimants
renders a class action an inappropriate means of proceeding, the
defendant no longer faces a class action; if the class is narrowed in
scope to exclude foreign class members, the defendant faces decreased
financial exposure and less pressure to settle.
There is one scenario, however, where the interests of the
plaintiffs and defendants are generally aligned: where they are seeking
certification of a settlement class. A settlement class is one in which
the plaintiffs and defendants agree to settle a class action before the
action is certified. The parties will present the court with the detailed
terms of the settlement agreement alongside a motion for certification.
The United States Supreme Court in Amchem Products, Inc. v
Windsor held that a class that is certified for settlement purposes must
nonetheless satisfy all the prongs of Rule 23, with the notable
exception of 23(b)(3)(D), the likely difficulties in managing a class
action.98 Because the action will not actually be tried to judgment, the
manageability of the class action is not a relevant concern in the
settlement context. Although Amchem is generally regarded as
making settlement-only certification more difficult for parties, the case
did not sound the predicted death knell for settlement-only class
actions.99 Settlement class actions continue to be certified in federal
96. It stands to reason that the greater the number of claimants in the class, the
greater the settlement value will be. That is, a defendant will pay more to settle the claims of
100,000 class members than it will to settle the claims of 10,000 class members. Because
lawyers are usually paid a percentage of the settlement amount, it follows that more claimants
translates into a higher settlement, which, in turn, translates into a higher fee recovery.
97. See, e.g, In re DaimlerChrysler AG Sec. Litig., 216 ER.D. 291, 301 (D. Del.
2003) ("However, in the Court's view, the appropriate way in which to address the concerns
related to foreign investors is not to deny class certification, but to certify a class comprising
only domestic investors. Accordingly, the Court will certify the class but exclude any foreign
investors from it.").
98. 521 U.S. 591,6 16 (1997); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(D).
99. See, eg., Elizabeth J. Cabraser, Life Alter Amchem: The Class Struggle
Continues, 31 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 373, 376 (1998) ("In a sense, the Amchem Supreme Court
decision was a nonevent. Those who sought to enforce their own nostalgia for the
nonexistent halcyon days of 'every man has his day in court' were disappointed that Amchem
did not smite down either class action settlements or settlement class actions.").
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courts, and many have migrated to state courts which are not bound by
the Amchem decision."
When the parties are seeking certification of a settlement class,
there is no reason for either side to raise the potential res judicata
problems associated with binding foreign claimants. Class counsel
will want the class to be defined as expansively as possible because the
fee collected will reflect the number of class members. Similarly, the
defendant will also wish to include the maximum number of claimants
in the class (both domestic and foreign) in an effort to achieve a global
resolution to the underlying legal issues. Most defendants would prefer
to buy global peace and have all claims, including foreign claims,
swept up in one U.S. proceeding.'"' Although it may be the case that
the U.S. class action judgment will not "stick" abroad-that is, bind
foreign absent class members in their home countries-it seems that
defendants would prefer to deal with that risk when, and if, it were to
develop.
The clearest illustration of the point is In re Royal Ahold N V
Secwities & "ERISA "Litigation, a transnational securities class action
involving alleged fraud perpetrated by a Dutch defendant.102 In that
case, plaintiffs sought to certify a class consisting of Dutch, German,
English, Swiss, and French purchasers of the defendant's securities.
Both the plaintiffs and defendants retained experts and fully briefed the
res judicata issue.' The defendants strenuously argued that foreign
plaintiffs should not be included within the class action, inter alia,
because "it is fundamentally unfair to deny Ahold the mutual right to a
final judgment in this action, thereby permitting foreign shareholders
100. Jesse Tiko Smallwood, Nationwide, State Law Class Actions and the Beauty of
Federalism, 53 DUKE L.J. 1137, 1138-39 (2003) ("Amchem's effect has been to make
settlement classes more difficult to certify in federal courts. Amehem, however, does not
apply to state courts. Thus, the same defendants who have criticized state courts for their
alleged abuse of the class action system are now also turning to state courts for assistance.").
101. Samuel Issacharoff & Geoffrey P Miller, Will Aggregate Litigation Come to
Europe?, 62 VAND. L. REv. 179, 206 (2009) ("U.S. experience indicates that defendants desire
to extinguish all liability when they settle a class action. That desire is expressed in clauses,
demanded by defendants, which declare the entire agreement to be null and void if more than
a specified number of plaintiffs opt out of the litigation. The goal of global peace also
indirectly benefits members of the class because defendants will pay more for settlements
that offer assurances against future litigation.").
102. See Memo in Opposition, supra note 73, at 5.
103. See id. at 11-13; Reply Memorandum of Law in Further Support of Lead
Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification, Appointment of Class Representatives and
Appointment of Class Counsel at 14-25, In re Royal Ahold N.V Sec. & "ERISA" Litig., No.
03-MD-01539, 2006 VL 132080 (D. Md. Dec. 19, 2005).
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to use an adverse decision against Ahold to their advantage, without
affording Ahold the benefit of any success it may achieve here.""
Before a decision was reached on class certification, the parties
agreed to settle the action. They jointly submitted a motion for
certification of a settlement class comprised of "[a]!! persons and
entities [that] purchased and/or received as a dividend Royal Ahold
N.V common shares and/or American Depository Receipts [during the
period] from July 30, 1999 through February 23, 2003, regardless of
where they live or where they purchased their Ahold shares."" The
United States District Court for the District of Maryland ultimately
approved the settlement which purported to bind both U.S. and non-
U.S. class members, and the res judicata problem was never addressed
any further. RoyalAholdclearly highlights that the preclusive effect of
a U.S. judgment abroad is only a problem if the defendant says it is.'
Thus, whether res judicata issues will even be raised in any given
transnational class action is a function of the posture of the litigation-
that is, whether the case is a contested certification or a settlement
certification. Usually, only in the former scenario will the defendant
have any incentive to raise due process concerns related to foreign
preclusion. This means that, as in Royal Ahola' whether foreign
claimants are included within the class may turn simply on whether the
certification motion is adversarial or nonadversarial. Clearly, this is a
less than principled way of ascertaining foreign claimants'
membership in U.S. class actions.
In short, there are certain features of the American litigation
system generally, and class litigation in particular-the proving of
foreign law via conflicting expert testimony, the principle of party
prosecution, and the distinction between certification for litigation
purposes and certification for settlement purposes-that cloud the
transnational class action landscape. Owing to these litigation
dynamics, courts are placed in a position where it is difficult to
determine in a principled manner whether including foreign class
104. Memo in Opposition, supra note 73, at 12.
105. In re Royal Ahold N.V Sec. & ERISA Litig., No. Civ. 03-MD-01539, 2006 WL
132080, at *1 (D. Md. Jan. 9, 2006) (emphasis added).
106. See also ln reParmalat Sec. Litig., 497 E Supp. 2d 526, 531-32 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)
(dismissing securities claims against two banks because the minimal U.S.-based conduct
alleged did not warrant extraterritorial application of the securities laws in favor of non-U.S.
resident absent class members; when defendants subsequently settled the class action claims,
the district court certified a worldwide class for settlement purposes and entered a final
judgment which included releases covering non-U.S. absent class members).
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members in a U.S. action is "superior to other available methods for
fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.""'
B. Structural Restrictions on the Search for Res Judicata
As discussed, there are issues surrounding how and when
preclusion concerns are raised by the parties to a transnational class
action. Specifically, the use of expert affidavits, the principle of party
prosecution, and the litigation posture of the case greatly affect the
ability of a court to properly gauge and analyze the res judicata issues
at play. Aside from these general features of class litigation that
interfere with a court's assessment of the res judicata issue, there are
also concerns about what courts are called upon to predict: whether a
U.S. class action judgment that is not yet in existence would, at some
later point in time, be accorded res judicata effect by a foreign court.
In this Part, I advance the position that the res judicata effect of
an eventual U.S. class judgment is inherently unknowable ex ante.
Thus, efforts at ascertaining whether a defendant faces the risk of
relitigation abroad because a foreign court will not grant preclusive
effect to a U.S. class judgment are tantamount to legal crystal ball-
gazing. I develop this idea by looking at three different issues: the
complexity of foreign law on the recognition and enforcement of
judgments, the newness of class action law in most foreign countries,
and the distinction between general and fact-specific grounds for
nonenforcement of a U.S. class judgment (what I refer to as the
distinction between "extrinsic" and "intrinsic" grounds for nonrecog-
nition). The confluence of these three factors-especially when
viewed in combination with the complicated litigation dynamics in
class proceedings-suggests that the practice of speculating as to the
res judicata effect of U.S. judgments is inappropriate and should be
abandoned.
1. Complexity of Foreign Law on the Recognition and Enforcement
of Judgments
In assessing whether a foreign court would accord res judicata
effect to a U.S. class judgment, U.S. courts have found themselves
parsing through a morass of foreign law on the recognition and
enforcement of judgments.'o8 The analysis is complicated by the fact
107. FED. R. Cv. P. 23(b)(3).
108. Wasserman persuasively argues that the res judicata analysis is even more
complicated than the American case law would suggest:
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that courts have had to discern first, what that foreign law is, and
second, how that foreign law would apply to a prospective U.S. class
judgment, bearing in mind that "actual recognition practice is more
diverse than the recognition law on the books."o' This is particularly
difficult given that few foreign jurisdictions have directly addressed the
issue of the enforceability of a U.S. class judgment."o
Despite the complexity of foreign law on judgment enforcement,
there appear to be several recurring grounds upon which foreign courts
might base a decision not to grant preclusive effect to a U.S. judgment,
each of which is explored in some detail below. The purpose of the
discussion is not to provide a fulsome analysis of potential grounds for
nonrecognition in various foreign jurisdictions."' Rather, the objective
American courts are conflating what should be a two-step analysis into one.
They should be asking, first, would the foreign court recognize the American class
action judgment? And second, if it would, what preclusive effect, if any, would the
American class action judgment have in the foreign court? Instead, while
employing both recognition and preclusion terminology, the American courts
typically focus only on the former question, examining only whether the foreign
court would decline to recognize the American class action judgment because it
violates "international public policy" The American courts rarely, if ever, consider
the second step: the preclusive effect, if any, that an American class action
judgment would receive if it were recognized abroad. The failure to address this
second step is problematic because even if a foreign court were to recognize an
American class action judgment, the defendant could face a risk of relitigation if
the judgment were not accorded robust preclusive effect.
Wasserman, supra note 7, at 316 (footnote omitted). Wasserman's position lends further
support to my overarching argument in this Article: that owing to the complexity of the
analysis, U.S. courts are not able to predict the fate of a U.S. class judgment abroad. I
disagree with her overarching premise, however, that U.S. courts should now take the analysis
one step furtherby looking at international preclusion law.
109. Samuel P Baumgartner, How Well Do US. Judgments Fare mn Europe? 40 GEO.
WASH. INT'L L. REv. 173, 177 (2008). He also notes:
[T]here have been countries in which some of the domestic recognition
requirements have been interpreted so as to make recognition of U.S. judgments
more difficult both to protect domestic firms from U.S. practices and in response to
U.S. approaches to transnational litigation that have been insensitive to sovereignty
concerns of those countries.
Id.at 181-82.
110. Bermann, supra note 1, at 96 ("U.S. courts are obviously accustomed to deciding
when they should (or should not) recognize or enforce a foreign country judgment, but they
are much less accustomed to predicting the fate of a U.S. class action judgment in a foreign
court. And yet, prediction is the most one can reasonably offer, given that no foreign court
has ever addressed the question or even a closely analogous one." (footnote omitted)); Pinna,
supra note 70, at 38 ("[T]he specificities of such a procedure make it nearly impossible to
apply reasoning by analogy, simply because European courts have not had the opportunity to
rule on similar situations.").
111. For an analysis of the enforceability of U.S. class judgments in Europe generally,
see Pinna, supra note 70. For country-specific materials, see John C.L. Dixon, The Res
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is to highlight some of the general concerns in enforcing U.S.
transnational class judgments, with a view toward demonstrating the
complexity of the issues at play, and the difficulties that U.S. courts
necessarily face in attempting to forecast the preclusive effect of U.S.
class judgments abroad."2
a. Jurisdiction
A foreign court may refuse to enforce a U.S. class judgment on
the basis that the U.S. court lacked jurisdictional competence in the
matter. In the traditional two-party adjudication context, the
jurisdiction issue is fairly straightforward. The foreign court will
consider whether a U.S. court had the power to bind a defendant."'
Under the law of many jurisdictions, whether the foreign court will
regard the defendant as bound by a U.S. judgment will turn on a
consideration of the nature of the contacts that the defendant had with
the litigation in the United States."4 In certain countries, however, a
defendant must be "present" in the United States, or have consented to
jurisdiction in the United States, in order for a foreign court to regard
the United States as jurisdictionally competent."' Additionally, some
foreign jurisdictions will only regard a U.S. court as competent in
Judicata Effect in England of a US Class Action Settlement 46 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 134
(1997) (England); Richard H. Dreyfuss, Class Action Judgment Enforcement in Italy:
Procedural "Due Process" Requirements, 10 TuL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 5 (2002) (Italy);
Jonathan Harris, The Recognition and Enforcement of US Class Action Judgments in
England [2006] CoNTRATIO E IMPRESA 617 (England); Marina Matousekova, Would French
Courts Enforce US. ClassAction Judgments, [2006] CONTRATIO E IMPRESA 651 (France).
112. A related concern stems from the fact that some countries use recognition law to
"exercise some leverage in response to what they see as power play by U.S. courts."
Baumgartner, supra note 109, at 228. If this is the case, then U.S. courts are never able to
approximate the decision that will be rendered by the foreign court simply by looking to the
technical requirements for enforceability in the foreign state.
113. The court need not consider whether the United States had the power to bind the
plaintiff, as the plaintiff has evidenced his consent to be bound by the result by virtue of
selecting the United States as the forum for litigation.
114. For instance, in the United States, the defendant is required to have "minimum
contacts" with the forum (see Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945)); in Canada,
there must be a "real and substantial connection" between the forum and the litigation (see
Morguard Invs. Ltd. v. De Savoye, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1077 (Can.); in France, and some other
civil law jurisdictions, there must be a "characteristic link" between the forum and the cause
of action (see Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters], le civ., Feb. 6,
1985, Bull. civ. I, No. 470 (Fr.)).
115. For the English position, see, for example, Tanya J. Monestier, Foreign Judgments
at Common Law: Rethinking the Enforcement Rules, 28 DALHOUSIE L.J. 163, 168 (2005)
("Apart from 'presence' and 'submission,' it is thought that no other basis of jurisdiction will
suffice to render a foreign court competent in the international sense, such that its judgment
will be enforced in England.").
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circumstances where the U.S. court assumed jurisdiction on grounds
that the foreign court itself employs in domestic civil litigation (the
"mirror image" principle)."'
The jurisdiction issue, however, takes on an added dimension in
the class action setting. The nature of a Rule 23(b)(3) class action is
such that class members are presumptively included within the class
unless they take affirmative measures to request exclusion, or opt out.
Unlike the plaintiff in traditional litigation, the plaintiffs in class
litigation have not actively consented to the jurisdiction of the U.S.
court. As such, a foreign court will likely need to consider whether the
U.S. court has personal jurisdiction over foreign absent class members.
In the United States, this issue was definitively addressed over twenty-
five years ago in Phillips Petroleum Co. v Shutts, where the Supreme
Court held that a court has personal jurisdiction over absent plaintiffs
as long as they have been provided with adequate representation,
notice, and the opportunity to opt out of the class action."'
In other countries, however, the question of personal jurisdiction
over plaintiffs is a decidedly alien one. That is, because most other
jurisdictions do not have anything akin to U.S.-style class action
litigation, the issue of personal jurisdiction over plaintiffs has simply
not arisen."' For instance, the Southern District of New York noted in
Vivend "[The] English authorities consistently discuss the
competency of a foreign court in terms of whether there was
jurisdiction over the defendant""' In the vast majority of
116. Linda J. Silberman, Some Judgements on Judgments: A View from America, 19
K.L.J. 235, 255 (2008) ("Some countries adopt what is often characterized as 'mirror image'
jurisdiction. That is, if a country permits the exercise of a particular basis of jurisdiction over
a foreign defendant by its courts, it will accept a similar assertion of jurisdiction by a foreign
court as an appropriate basis ofjurisdiction in the recognition/enforcement context.").
117. 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985). For general commentary on the Shutts decision, see
Edward H. Cooper, Rewriting Shutts for Fun, Not To Profit, 74 UMKC L. REv. 569 (2006);
Arthur R. Miller & David Crump, Jurisdiction and Choice ofLaw in Multistate ClassActions
After Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 96 YALE L.J. 1 (1986); Linda S. Mullenix, Getting to
Shutts, 46 U. KAN L. REv 727 (1998); Brian Wolfinan & Alan B. Morrison, What the Shutts
Opt-Out Right Is and What It Ought To Be, 74 UMKC L. REv. 729 (2006); Patrick Woolley,
Shutts and the Adequate Representation Requirement 74 UMKC L. REv. 765 (2006).
118. Pinna, supm note 70, at 57 ("[Personal jurisdiction over plaintiffs] is not generally
a condition required for recognition but the peculiarity of US class actions procedures does
seem to require such supplementary investigation by the court .... The absence of case law
on this point renders the issue very complex.").
119. Vivendig 242 ER.D. 76, 102 (S.D.N.Y 2007). Some English commentators take
this to mean that jurisdiction over the plaintiff is not a relevant consideration in enforcing a
U.S. class judgment. See Harris, supm note 111, at 633 ("[Imt can be argued that unless and
until a specific exception evolves (and none has evolved yet in English private international
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circumstances where foreign law is silent on the question of personal
jurisdiction over absent plaintiffs, U.S. courts are left in an
uncomfortable position: they can ignore the issue altogether; they can
assume that the foreign court would extend general principles of
jurisdiction over the defendant to the class of absent plaintiffs; or they
can assume that a foreign court would adopt U.S.-style Shutts
reasoning to the issue. Clearly, none of these options is entirely
satisfactory; they either result in U.S. courts ignoring a critical
recognition issue or "making up" foreign law based on limited
information.
b. Public Policy
Nearly all legal systems provide a basis for not recognizing or
enforcing a foreign judgment where to do so would violate the forum's
public policy.120 The public policy defense to recognition (sometimes
referred to by the French term "ordrepublid') is generally regarded as
connoting something more than simply a distaste of a foreign law or
some aspect of the foreign judgment.12' Rather, public policy is seen as
protecting against the enforcement of judgments that grossly offend a
sense of universal justice or basic morality.1'
At the forefront of concerns about class actions is the issue of
whether the opt-out feature of U.S. class actions is compatible with the
public policy of foreign countries. In the words of one European
law), there is a good case for the recognition of a US class action judgment in England, where
the US court has jurisdiction over the defendantin the eyes of English law.").
120. On the doctrine of public policy generally, see Joost Blom, Public Policy im
Private International Law and Its Evolution in Tine, 50 NETH. INT'L L. REv. 373 (2003); Alex
Mills, The Dimensions of Public Policy in Private International Law, 4 J. PRIVATE INT'L L.
201 (2008); Horatia Muir Watt, Evidence of an Emergent European Legal Culture: Public
Policy Requirements of Procedural Fairness Under the Brussels andLugano Conventions, 36
TEX. INT'L L.J. 539 (2001).
121. Notably, public policy is not necessarily offended because the particular cause of
action or legal mechanism employed in the foreign court does not exist domestically. See
Pinna, supa note 70, at 41 ("International public policy does not prevent a juridical situation
created abroad to produce effect in the forum simply because the legal institution or the
procedure applied do not exist. In other words, the mere fact that a legal rule or a procedural
tool that does not exist, or even could not be enacted, in the country where a foreign judgment
is asked to produce its Res Judicata effects, is not enough to consider the foreign judgment to
be contrary to public policy.").
122. Blom, supra note 120, at 374 ("Public policy intervenes to block the 'normal'
application of other conflicts rules in order to avoid an unacceptable derogation from values
that the court sees as fundamental to its own legal system."); Mills, supra note 120, at 202
("As a 'safety net' to choice-of-law rules and rules governing the recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments, it is a doctrine which crucially defines the outer limits of
the 'tolerance of difference' implicit in those rules.").
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commentator, "Even if the legal grounds are not always the same, it is
clear that everywhere in Europe the main problem with US class
actions is the opt-out mechanism and its asserted contrariety to the
domestic foundations of civil procedure."'23 The argument regarding
public policy manifests itself in several ways, but all revolve around
the central theme that a plaintiff can only become a party to the
litigation (and therefore be bound by any result) where he has
affirmatively engaged the processes of the court. The court in Vivendi
elaborated upon how recognition of a U.S. opt-out class judgment
might be counter to public policy in France:
First, it is an accepted principle of French law that no one may claim in
court by proxy This principle-in French, nul ne plaide par procureur-
procedurally requires anyone acting as a plaintiff or defendant in a
lawsuit to make his identity known individually in the legal
proceedings. As a result, defendants' [sic] argue, the fact that not all
members of the putative class will be identified by name, but instead
represented by court-appointed class representatives, will be fatal to
recognition of a U.S. judgment in this case by a French court.
Defendants further argue that the failure to identify each plaintiff
individually contravenes French notions of due process. This is because
of a "strong principle" of French law that no one should be a plaintiff
without consenting affirmatively to do so. Members of an opt-out
class, of course, are not required to take any steps to be included in this
class. Defendants also argue that the opt-out class is inconsistent with
the fundamental principle of adversarial proceedings, le principe du
contrdictoire, which gives every litigant the "personal freedom" to
appear and be heard during any proceeding affecting his rights.
Particularly where individual notice is not required (as is permissible
under Rule 23), a class member could be deprived of his fundamental
right to appear without ever having received actual notice.124
The public policy debate over the recognition of the U.S. opt-out
mechanism takes on a similar flavor in other jurisdictions. In
Germany, for instance, the argument might be that a U.S. class action
judgment violates Article 103 of the German Constitution, which
establishes the right of citizens to participate and be heard in legal
proceedings.125 Or, in Sweden, claimants may resist the recognition of
a U.S. class judgment on the basis that the opt-out feature of Rule 23
123. Pinna, supra note 70, at 41.
124. VivendiI 242 F.R.D. at 100 (citations omitted).
125. Id. at 104. Note that according to the affidavits presented in Vivendi, this form of
due process protection is referred to as the right of "correct representation" or the
"disposition maxim." Id
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violates "the Swedish principle that people have the right to decide for
themselves whether they want to file a suit or not."l26 In short, the
public policy defense to recognition requires U.S. courts to confront
the intricate issue of whether the opt-out feature of U.S.-style class
actions is fundamentally incompatible with core principles of
procedure in foreign states-a feat which involves delving deep into
foreign procedural and constitutional law.
c. Natural or Procedural Justice
A foreign court may also refuse to enforce a U.S. class judgment
on the basis that the judgment, or the process by which it was rendered,
contravenes fundamental principles of natural justice.'27 Natural justice
entails the right to a fair procedure, which, at a minimum, includes
notice and an opportunity to be heard.'28 As with other defenses to
recognition, natural justice in traditional two-party litigation is
generally conceptualized in reference to the defendant.'29 In the class
context, an absent plaintiff can also raise natural justice as a defense to
the enforcement of a U.S. judgment. The natural justice argument
could take on several permutations. First, an absent plaintiff could
argue that active consent is necessary in order to bind the plaintiff
class. As such, any form of notice whereby plaintiffs are required to
opt out is per se deficient. This argument clearly dovetails with that of
public policy, described above. Second, an absent plaintiff may argue
that actualnotice is required under principles of natural justice. Under
this logic, an absent plaintiff could only be bound by a U.S. class
judgment in circumstances where he actually received the notice and
did not take steps to opt out of the proceeding. Third, an absent
plaintiff may challenge the particular contentof the notice, arguing that
126. Laurel J. Harbour & Marc E. Shelley, The Emerging European Class Action:
Expanding Multi-Party Litigation to a Shnnhing Worl, PRAC. LITIGATOR, July 2007, at 27
(citing Proposition 2001/02:1070064, 8), available at http://www.shb.com/attorneys/Shelley/
TheEmergingEuropean.pdf.
127. See INT'L BAR Ass'N LEGAL PRACTICE Div., GUIDELINES FOR RECOGNISING AND
ENFORCING FOREIGN JUDGMENTS FOR COLLECTIVE REDRESS 23 (Oct. 16, 2008) ("Natural
justice and due process as requirements for recognition or enforcement of a foreign judgment
have universal acceptance.").
128. See, e.g., Council Regulation 44/2001, art. 34, 2000 O.J. (L 012) 1 (EC)
[hereinafter Brussels Regulation]. The Brussels Regulation is, of course, not directly
applicable to the enforcement of U.S. judgments, as it is only concerned with the enforcement
of judgments issued by E.U. Member States. However, it does embody what are generally
regarded as universal principles pertaining to the recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments.
129. See id
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the specific notice in question was complicated or confusing, and
thereby rendered the plaintiff unable to meaningfully understand his
rights. Fourth, the absent plaintiff may argue that the notice was not
disseminated widely enough, such that the proceeding was not a truly
representative one. In any of these scenarios, the end result would be
the same: the judgment would not be accorded preclusive effect, and
the absent class member would be permitted to relitigate the claim in a
foreign jurisdiction.
d. Miscellaneous Grounds for Nonenforcement
There are myriad other bases upon which a foreign court may
conclude that it is not appropriate to accord res judicata effect to a U.S.
class judgment. These include: the judgment is not considered final;3 o
the judgment is not "on the merits";"' the judgment is not for a fixed
sum;' there is an already-existing forum judgment that is
incompatible with the U.S. judgment;' the judgment conflicts with an
already-existing foreign judgment that is entitled to recognition;34 the
U.S. judgment raises questions of foreign public law;'" the foreign
130. Baumgartner, supra note 109, at 191 (observing that generally for a foreign
judgment to be recognized by a European court, the judgment must be final). Note, however,
that this is not a requirement for enforceability under the Brussels Regulation. See also
Richard Fentiman, The European Regime for Enforcing Foreign Judgements, 19 INT'L L.
PRACTICUM 160, 160 (2006).
13 1. See, e.g., Andrew Dickinson, Transnational Secuities Class Actions-A Private
International Law Perspective, CONFLICT OF LAWS.NET (July 15, 2010), http://conflict
oflaws.net/2010/transnational-securities-class-actions-a-private-international-law-perspective
("Finally, in the case of a U.S. judgment approving a class action settlement, it seems doubtful
whether [under English law] the judgment meets the requirement that the judgment be 'on the
merits'. . . .
132. For the position in England, see Beatty v Beatty, [1924] 1 K.B. 807 (C.A.) at 816
(Eng.) ("No doubt a judgment to be final must be for a sum certain. But a sum is sufficiently
certain for that purpose if it can be ascertained by a simple arithmetical process."). Some
jurisdictions have abandoned the requirement that the judgment be for a fixed sum. See, e.g.,
Pro Swing Inc. v. Elta Golf Inc., [2006] 2 S.C.R. 612, para. 15 (Can.) ("[T]he time is ripe to
revise the traditional common law rule that limits the recognition and enforcement of foreign
orders to final money judgments."); Fentiman, supra note 130, at 160 (noting that under the
Brussels I Regulation, "[t]he judgment need not be ... for a fixed sum of money" in order to
be enforceable).
133. See, e.g., Brussels Regulation, supra note 128, art. 34 ("A judgment shall not be
recognised: .. . if it is irreconcilable with a judgment given in a dispute between the same
parties in the Member State in which recognition is sought. . . .").
134. See, eg., id. ("A judgment shall not be recognised: . . . if it is irreconcilable with
an earlier judgment given in another Member State or in a third State involving the same
cause of action and between the same parties, provided that the earlier judgment fulfils the
conditions necessary for its recognition in the Member State addressed.").
135. Buschkin, supra note 6, at 1579 ("[C]ourts are often wary about enforcing foreign
judgments based upon public law subjects, such as securities or antitrust.").
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court applied the wrong law; 136 the foreign court did not have subject
matter jurisdiction;' or the judgment was obtained by fraud."' Each
of these general grounds for nonrecognition would provide a foreign
court with a legitimate basis upon which to refuse enforcement of a
US. class judgment and, possibly, to permit an absent plaintiff to
litigate the claim abroad.
This brief survey illustrates the breadth of challenges that absent
plaintiffs may ultimately level at a US. class judgment in order to
escape its res judicata effect abroad. U.S. courts considering whether a
foreign court would recognize an eventual class judgment are forced to
navigate through a complicated maze of foreign law on the recognition
and enforcement of judgments.
In fact, a quick perusal of the US. case law shows the intricacies
of the foreign judgment recognition landscape in practice. In Vvend'
the Southern District of New York identified the following elements as
relevant to the enforcement of a U.S. judgment in France:
The conditions that must be met under Munzer in order to grant
exequatur may be summarized as follows: (1) the foreign court must
properly have jurisdiction under French law (the "jurisdictional prong");
(2) the foreign court must have applied the appropriate law under
French conflict-of-law principles (the "applicable-law prong"); (3) the
decision must not contravene French concepts of international public
policy (the "public policy prong"); and (4) the decision must not be a
result of frde J la loi (evasion of the law) or forum shopping (the
"forum shopping prong").'
In turn, each of the four prongs of the Munzer test for the
recognition and enforcement of judgments contains further "sub-
prongs." For instance, whether a U.S. court is regarded as
jurisdictionally competent is governed by the Simitch v Fahurstcase,
which holds that in order for a foreign court to have properly exercised
its jurisdiction, the following requirements must be met: "(1) the case
must not fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the French courts,
136. Silberman, supra note 116, at 253 ("[A] few countries continue to use a choice-
of-law check as part of the law on foreign-judgment recognition and enforcement practice.").
137. Fentiman, supm note 130, at 161 ("A judgment is unenforceable if the court of
origin assumes jurisdiction contrary to the Regulation's rules concerning insurance or
consumer contracts, or those providing for exclusive jurisdiction under article 22 . . . .").
138. Baumgartner, supm note 109, at 191 (noting that generally for a foreign judgment
to be recognized by a European court, the judgment must not be based on fraud).
139. Wvendil, 242 ER.D. 76, 96 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). Note that Matousekova argues that
there is an additional element that must be satisfied in France, namely that "the foreign
proceedings must have been conducted in a regular manner." Matousekova, supm note 111,
at 654.
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(2) the circumstances of the case or judgment at issue must be linked
in a 'characterized manner' to the foreign court, and (3) the choice of
the foreign court must not be fraudulent."'40 Each of these Sitch
elements pertaining to the jurisdictional prong requires additional
refinement. Part (3) of the Sinitch test, for example, is further
subdivided into two different elements: "[T]he foreign judgment must
not have been obtained through deceitful maneuvers[,] [and] the case
must not have been brought in a foreign court in order to obtain a
ruling from that foreign court, under foreign law that differs from the
law to which a litigant would otherwise be subjected domestically."4 '
An analysis of each of the prongs and subprongs of the French
framework for the recognition and enforcement of judgments requires
U.S. courts to scrutinize painstakingly the law through the lens of
French jurisprudence. The potential for error is plain: a U.S. court
must correctly "guess" as to how a French court would answer no less
than a dozen questions.
Clearly, the grounds upon which a foreign court may refuse to
enforce a U.S. transnational class judgment are manifold and will
depend on the particulars of judgment enforcement in the foreign state.
However, given the number of grounds upon which a U.S. class
judgment might be refused recognition and the complexity of foreign
recognition law, it is virtually impossible for U.S. courts to accurately
assess whether a foreign court would accord preclusive effect to the
U.S. judgment.'42
2. Foreign Law on Aggregate Litigation
In assessing whether a foreign court would enforce a U.S.
transnational class judgment, many U.S. courts have examined the
status of aggregate litigation'43 generally in the foreign jurisdiction.'44
140. Cour. de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters], Ie civ., Feb. 6.
1985, Bull. civ. I, No. 470 (Fr.) (quoting VivendiI 242 F.R.D. at 96).
141. VivendiI 242 F.R.D. at 98 (internal quotation marks omitted).
142. Note that sometimes it may be possible for a U.S. court to accurately conclude
that a foreign court wouldnotenforce a U.S. class judgment-for example, because there is a
statute precluding enforcement in the relevant jurisdiction.
143. I use the term "aggregate litigation" deliberately because it encompasses both
class actions as well as other forms of collective redress. See Nagareda, supm note 4, at 20
("The term 'aggregate litigation' creates a big tent, within which one may place both
representative litigation for claimants as a collective group and consolidated litigation
whereby each claimant's suit has a nominally separate existence.").
144. The issue is usually raised as part of the analysis of the "public policy" of the
foreign jurisdiction. See, e g., In rAlstom SA Sec. Litig., 253 ER.D. 266, 285-87 (S.D.N.Y
2008) (looking at the status of French law on aggregate litigation as part of the "public
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At a very broad level, the more the foreign country regime resembles
that which exists in the United States, the more likely a U.S. court is to
conclude that the foreign court would accord preclusive effect to a U.S.
class judgment. In reality, however, U.S. courts are unable to glean
much insight into whether a foreign court would enforce a U.S. class
judgment based on an analysis of foreign aggregation mechanisms.
Such mechanisms-to the extent that they even exist-are new,
evolving, and do not look anything like U.S. Rule 23. Accordingly, "It
is risky . . . to attempt a detailed analysis of any particular country's
venture into class actions." 4 5
Aggregate litigation outside the United States is in a nascent
state.'46 Although class actions in their modem incarnation have been
around in the United States since the 1960s,'47 very few jurisdictions
outside the United States have any sort of track record with aggregate
litigation, much less "U.S.-style" class actions.'48 It is only in the past
policy" prong of the recognition analysis). See generally Jasilli, supra note 71, at 125. Jasilli
argues that courts are creating an "autonomous rubric" based on "(1) the existence of
analogous forms of action in the foreign [jurisdiction]; and (2) emerging legal norms" that
appear to accept U.S. class actions. Id. He criticizes courts for employing this "autonomous
rubric," rather than established principles ofjudgment recognition law. Jasilli states:
Not only does it lack basis in any identifiable foreign law, but there is also no
scholarly work supporting the principles employed by the court. Nowhere are
either analogous forms of action or emerging legal norms held out as even reliable,
not to mention powerful, evidence for assessing the likelihood of foreign
recognition of a judgment.
Id. at 128.
145. Issacharoff& Miller, supra note 101, at 192.
146. See Samuel P Baumgartner, Class Actions and Group Litigation in Switzerlano
27 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 301, 308-09 (2007) ("Although there have increasingly been
suggestions to introduce class actions-at least in limited circumstances-in many other
countries, few of those countries have yet acted on them. Among those that have, most are
squarely in the common law tradition (Australia, England, and several Canadian provinces
other than Quebec), and a few (Quebec and Sweden) have a close connection to common law
procedure, with Brazil as the big exception." (footnotes omitted)).
147. For a historical account of class action litigation, see Stephen C. Yeazell, Group
Litigation and Social Context: Toward a istory of the Class Action, 77 COLUM. L. REv. 866
(1977).
148. Deborah R. Hensler, The Globalization of Class Actions: An Overview, 622
ANNALs AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. Sci. 7, 16 (2009), available at http://ann.sagepub.com/
content/622/l/7 ("Because the United States has been the leading model for class action
adoption in recent years, its choices with regard to these different class action procedure
design features-standing for private actors to represent a class, trans-substantive application
of the procedure, availability of money damages, and an opt-out rather than an opt-in
procedure for money damage class actions-constitute what has come to be known as a
'U.S.-style class action.' Of the eighteen countries that reported some form of class action
procedure, only six in addition to the United States have such a class action regime:
Australia, Canada, Indonesia, Israel, Portugal, and Norway.").
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decade or so that certain foreign countries have begun to experiment
with some form of aggregation of claims.149
Moreover, the aggregate litigation mechanisms that are emerging
outside the United States do not resemble the classical American Rule
23 opt-out class action model.' One author observes that in Europe,
opt-out forms of collective redress are "most definitely the exception,"
with only Denmark, the Netherlands, and Portugal adopting some
version of the opt-out mechanism.' Many foreign countries are in
fact deliberately taking steps to fashion collective redress procedures
that do not mimic those in the United States. Several commentators
have noted this conscious trend away from U.S.-style collective
litigation in Europe. For instance, Samuel Issacharoff and Geoffrey
Miller write:
And, yet, one need spend only a few minutes in conversations with
European reformers before the proverbial "but" enters the discourse:
"But, of course, we shall not have American-style class actions." At this
point, all participants nod sagely, confident that collective actions,
representative actions, group actions, and a host of other aggregative
arrangements can bring all the benefits of fair and efficient resolution
to disputes without the dreaded world of American entrepreneurial
lawyering. And no doubt the American entrepreneurial ways must and
will be resisted fully, in much the same way that Europe has held off the
unwelcome presence of McDonald's or Starbucks in its elegant
piazzas. 52
Similarly, Richard Nagareda observes:
European leaders speak of designing distinctively European solutions
that do not import what they see as the "litigation culture" of the United
States. EU Competition Commissioner Neelie Kroes emphasizes: "I
149. According to Nagareda, the support for aggregate litigation abroad has rendered
the U.S.-style class action "less exceptional" in the Western world. The point, however,
should not be overstated: the receptiveness of foreign countries to new procedures for
aggregate litigation "stops markedly short of full-fledged embrace for U.S.-style class
actions." Nagareda, supm note 4, at 6.
150. See Mark A. Behrens et al., Global Litigation Trends, 17 MICH. ST. J. INT'L L.
165, 172-73 (2009) ("Not all counties [sic] ... are jumping on the bandwagon. For instance,
in counties [sic] such as Japan, Austria, Belgium, and Switzerland, suggestions to examine
the possibility of introducing class action procedures have met with considerable opposition."
(footnotes omitted)).
15 1. Rachael Mulheron, The Case for an Opt-Out Class Action for European Member
States. A Legal and Empiical Analysis, 15 COLUM. J. EuR. L. 409, 415 (2009). Note that
Italy's class action statute, enacted into law in 2010, also provides for an opt-out mechanism.
See Roald Nashi, Note, Italyk Class Action Experineni 43 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 147, 148
(2010).
152. Issacharoff& Miller, supra note 101, at 180.
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do not want to cut and paste an American-style system here. We must
avoid excessive levels of litigation." EU Consumer Protection
Commissioner Meglena Kuneva adds: "This is not a John Grisham
story."'
As these authors intimate, foreign aversion to U.S.-style litigation
can be seen as both a reaction to the perceived excesses and abuses
associated with U.S. class actions'54 and as a manifestation of a
different cultural perspective on the resolution of claims.' Regardless
of the reasons for this aversion, the fact remains that foreign countries
are consciously embracing mechanisms of aggregate dispute
resolution that do not resemble the American Rule 23 opt-out model.'
153. Nagareda, supm note 4, at 27-28 (footnotes omitted).
154. See, e g., Lester Brickman, Anatomy of a Madison County (Illinois) Class
Action: A Study of Pathology, CTR. FOR LEGAL POL'Y Civ. JusT. REP., Aug. 2002, at 1-3
(setting forth a case study of victims of "class action justice" in popular plaintiffs' haven,
Madison County, Illinois); Victor E. Schwartz et al., West Virginia as a Judicial Hellhole:
Why Businesses Fear Litigating in State Courts, 111 W. VA. L. REv. 757 (2009) (discussing
why West Virginia continues to present one of the nation's worst legal climates). The
American Tort Reform Association compiles an annual list of U.S. jurisdictions that have
"developed reputations for uneven justice." See Judicial Hellholes 2009/2010, AM. TORT
REFORM FOUND. (2009), http://www.judicialhellholes.org/2009-20 10.
155. It is sometimes said that European countries prefer methods of aggregation which
prioritize "closure" rather than "enabling." Nagareda, supm note 4, at 28 ("[Olne might say
that Europe seeks to strike a precarious balance-to facilitate the closure of related civil
claims in the aggregate but, at the same time, not to 'enable' litigation."). Nagareda
continues:
[T]he relative emphasis in Europe on closure over enabling is revealing. Such a
view accords considerable normative significance to the individual civil claim in
the sense of taking it as something like a strong baseline for what one might call
the appropriate level of claiming. On this view, aggregate procedure-if embraced
at all-largely comes along afterwards to deal with the claims already in the
system.
Id at 30.
156. One notable exception is the Dutch Collective Settlement Act of 2005. See
Murtagh, supm note 7, at 40. The Act is aimed at facilitating the settlement (not litigation) of
mass disputes through aggregation on an opt-out basis. Id at 39-40. The potency of the
Dutch Act rests on the fact that a settlement that has the judicial approval of a Dutch court is
readily enforceable throughout the European Union through the Brussels Regulation. Id at
38. Some have observed: "[T]he Netherlands [is] becoming a mecca for European class
action settlements, in the way that Delaware has become a destination for bankruptcy law."
Michael Goldhaber, "Shell Model" Opens Door to European Class Actions, AM. LAW.COM
(Jan. 7, 2008), http://www.law.com/jsp/cc/PubArticleCC.jsp?id=1199700328427. In 2009,
the Amsterdam Court of Appeals issued a ruling authorizing Royal Dutch Shell to begin
funding an April 2007 securities settlement reached under the Dutch Act in the amount of
$381 million. See Press Release, The Hague, Amsterdam Court of Appeals Declares Shell
Settlement Binding (May 29, 2009), available at http://www.shellsettlement.com/docs/2009
0529-press%20release%20amsterdam%20court%/o200f%/o2appeals%20declares%2shell%20
settlement/o20binding.pdf. Recently, on January 10, 2011, a special foundation backed by over
140 institutional investors and 2000 individuals from the United States, Europe, Middle East,
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In concrete terms, most jurisdictions outside the United States
have shown a preference for opt-in forms of aggregate litigation. An
opt-in collective redress procedure requires that class members
affirmatively consent to participate in the litigation in order to be
bound thereby. Leaving aside the merits of the debate between the
desirability of opt-in versus opt-out regimes," the opt-in regime is
thought to better accord with foreign notions of due process by
"respect[ing] the jurisprudential idea that litigation cannot be
legitimate, as regards an innocent party, unless he has voluntarily
agreed to join the action."'
Whereas class litigation in the United States allows individual
litigants to pursue damages in a wide variety of substantive contexts
(for example, antitrust, and securities and consumer protection)
collective action mechanisms that are developing abroad tend to be
more circumscribed in scope.'" In addition, in many foreign countries,
private individuals do not have standing to bring a collective action;
rather, the action must be initiated by some sort of public association
and Australia filed a securities action in Utrecht Civil Court under the Dutch Act over the
collapse of Belgium-based financial services provider Fortis N.V See InternadonalInvestors
Join Forces in Support of Lawsuit Against Fortis over Massive Misrepresentation Ahead of
Bank Collapse in 2008, PR NEWSWIRE (Jan. 10, 2011), http://www.pmewswire.com/news-
releases/international-investors-join-forces-in-support-of-lawsuit-against-fortis-over-massive-
misrepresentation-ahead-of-banks-collapse-in-2008-113195084.html. Note, however, that
Dutch courts are still grappling with issues concerning the jurisdiction of Dutch courts over
foreign parties. See, eg., Gerechtshof [Hofj [Amsterdam Court of Appeal], 12 Nov. 2010,
No. 200.070. 039/01 (SCOR Holding (Switzerland) AG/Zurich Fin. Serv. Ltd. Stichting
Convenun Sec. Compensation Found./Vereniging VEBNCVB) (unreported) (Neth.),
tnslated in Sworn Translation from Dutch to English of Decision by the Amsterdam Court
ofAppeal in Case No. 200.070.039/01 rendered on 12 November 2010, (A.J.B. Burrough, 24
Feb. 2011), available at http://www.blbglaw.com/cases/00172 data/Judgmentofl2November
2010CourtofAppeal.pdf (unreported) (Neth.) (holding provisionally that the Dutch court had
jurisdiction over foreign purchasers named in the settlement). For further discussion of the
Dutch Act, see Tomas Arons & Willem H. Van Boom, Beyond Tulips and Cheese: Exporting
Mass Securides Claim Settlements from the Netherlands 2010 EuR. Bus. L. REv. 857.
157. See Issacharoff & Miller, supia note 101, at 202 ("But opt-in procedures also
pose problems [including] problems with incentivizing a named plaintiff under an opt-in
regime, difficulties in attracting adequate participation rates, and the challenge of offering
defendants the opportunity to achieve global peace through the class procedure.").
158. Id
159. Hensler, supra note 148, at 14 ("In about half of the countries that have adopted
some form of class action procedure (ten of eighteen), the procedure is 'trans-substantive,'
meaning that it can be used for a variety of substantively different legal claims. In the
remaining countries, the use of class actions is limited to securities, antitrust
(anticompetition), consumer fraud, or constitutional rights claims or some designated mix
thereof.").
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or government agent.'" For instance, the Finnish Group Action Act
(2007) applies exclusively to consumer disputes and can only be
initiated by the government-funded "consumer ombudsman.""' In
France, two forms of collective action procedures exist: "Actions
Taken in a Collective Interest" and "Joint Representative Actions."'62
While the scope of both is fairly broad, only authorized associations
may initiate such actions.' In Germany, collective litigation generally
takes the form of complaints by interests groups, wherein associations
serve as intermediaries between the individual person and the state. A
specialized collective dispute resolution procedure, the Capital
Investors' Model Proceeding Law (KapMuG), also exists in Germany
to provide for the resolution of securities disputes."
Several foreign countries have fashioned collective action
procedures that do not allow individual claimants to collect money
damages for injuries suffered. Rachael Mulheron notes that fourteen
Member States of the European Union do not have any form of
collective redress mechanisms that would enable groups of claimants
to recover judicially-awarded damages.' Rather, in the vast majority
of these jurisdictions, some form of group or representative action may
be initiated but only for a limited purpose, such as seeking injunctive
relief."'
160. Id. ("Who has legal standing to bring representative litigation differs across
jurisdictions and within jurisdictions standing is often conditioned on multiple factors.
Standing may be limited to associations that the government has approved for the purpose of
bringing representative actions, or to specially designated public officials.").
161. Klaus Viitanen, Fmnlan 622 ANNALS AM. AcAD. POL. & Soc. Sci. 209, 213
(2009), available at http://ann.sagepub.com/content/622/1/209 ("[T]he Finnish act clearly
differs from the other Nordic countries. According to the committee report published in
2006, the scope of application was to be restricted to two types of disputes: mass consumer
disputes and environmental damage issues. The government's proposal adopted by
Parliament was even stricter: group action would be possible in mass consumer disputes
only. So according to article 1.1. of the Group Action Act, the act applies, within the limits of
the competence of the Consumer Ombudsman, to the hearing of a civil case between a
consumer and a business as a class action." (footnote omitted)).
162. Nagareda, supm note 4, at 23 (internal quotation marks omitted).
163. Seeid.
164. Choi & Silberman, supra note 6, at 486-87 ("[I]n 2005, Germany passed the
Capital Investors' Model Proceeding Law (KapMuG), which provides for designation of a
'model case' in actions by investors for false, misleading, or omitted public capital-markets
information or shareholder actions for specific performance in actions brought under the
Securities Acquisition and Takeover Act. The model case proceeds and then all individual
cases are decided on the basis of the model-case decision." (footnote omitted)).
165. Mulheron, supmnote 151, at 415-16.
166. Id at 416; see also Richard 0. Faulk, Armageddon Through Aggregation? The
Use andAbuse of ClassActions 01 International Dispute Resolution, 37 TORT & INS. L.J. 999,
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Again, the objective here is not to provide a thorough analysis of
various foreign collective dispute resolution mechanisms, but to
illustrate the broad range of approaches to aggregate litigation that are
developing abroad.' These foreign collective action regimes differ
significantly from the U.S. Rule 23 model: they tend to be opt-in,
rather than opt-out; they are generally oriented toward protecting
consumers rather than broadly remedying all civil wrongs; they often
only allow standing to consumer or public interest organizations; and
they may be limited in the remedy that they can provide to individual
claimants.
1015 (2002) ("Many states restrict the utility of the group action to injunctive proceedings,
as opposed to suits for money damages.").
167. For a broad overview of collective dispute resolution mechanisms abroad, see
RACHAEL MULHERON, THE CLASS ACTION IN COMMON LAW LEGAL SYSTEMS: A
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (2004); Behrens, supia note 150; Richard B. Cappalli & Claudio
Consolo, Class Actions for Continental Europe? A Prluniary Inquiy, 6 TEMP. INT'L &
COMP. L. 217 (1992); Antonio Gidi, The Class Action Code: A Model for Civil Law
Countries, 23 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 37 (2005); Harbour & Shelley, supm note 126;
Hensler, supra note 148; Christopher Hodges, Multi-Party Actions: A European Approach,
11 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 321 (2001); Issacharoff& Miller, supra note 101; Angel R.
Oquendo, Upping the Ante: Collective Litigation in Latin America, 47 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 248 (2009); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Debates over Group Litigation in
Comparative Perspective: What Can We Learn from Each Other? 11 DuKE J. COMP. & INT'L
L. 157 (2001); Tiana Leia Russell, Exporting Class Actions to the European Union, 28 B.U.
INT'L L.J. 141 (2010); Edward F Sherman, Group Litigation Under Foreign Legal Systems:
Variations and Alternatives to American Class Actions, 52 DEPAUL L. REv. 401 (2002);
Manuel A. G6mez, Will the Birds Stay South? The Rise of ClassActions and Other Forms of
Group Litigation Across Latin America (Fla. Int'l Univ. Legal Studies Research Paper Series,
Research Paper No. 11-23, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-1930413. For
country-specific materials, see Neil Andrews, Multi-Party Proceedings in England:
Representative and Group Actions, 11 DuKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 249 (2001) (England);
Baumgartner, supra note 146 (Switzerland); Willem H. van Boom, Collective Settlement of
Mass Claims in The Netherlands, in AUF DEM WEG ZU EINER EUROPAISCHEN SAMMELKLAGE?
171 (Matthias Casper et al. eds., 2009) (Netherlands); S. Stuart Clark & Christina Harris,
Multi-PlaintiffLitigation inAustralia: A Comparative Perspective, 11 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L
L. 289 (2001) (Australia); Stuart Clark & Christina Harris, The Push To Reform ClassAction
Procedure in Australia: Evolution or Revolution?, 32 MELB. U. L. REv 775 (2008)
(Australia); Antonio Gidi, Class Actions in Brazil-A Model for Civil Law Countries, 51
AM. J. COMP. L. 311 (2003) (Brazil); Nashi, supia note 151 (Italy); Roberth Nordh, Group
Actions in Sweden: Reflections on the Purpose of Civil Litigation, the Need for Reforms,
and a Forthcoming Proposal, 11 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 381 (2001) (Sweden); Gerhard
Walter, Mass Tort Liigation in Germany and Switzerlano 11 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 369
(2001) (Germany and Switzerland); Garry D. Watson, Class Actions: The Canadian
Experience, 11 DuKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 269 (2001) (Canada). Note also that Professors
Hensler and Hodges have established the Global Class Action Exchange, an electronic forum
for research on class actions, group proceedings, and other forms of collective litigation. The
forum contains "Country Reports" on the status of class action law abroad. Deborah R.
Hensler, Global Class Actions Exchange, STAN. L. SCH., http://globalclassactions.stanford.
edu/ (last visited Oct. 13, 2011).
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Moreover, it must be borne in mind that foreign law on aggregate
litigation is in a constant state of evolution and flux. According to
Issacharoff and Miller, "Rules here are rapidly changing, and new
proposals and recommendations are appearing at a dizzying rate."68
Finland, for instance, adopted its Group Action Act in 2007;169
Argentina and Denmark enacted statutes providing for collective
redress in 2008;"70 Italy passed its class action law in 2010;' and
Mexico passed its first class action law in 201 1.7' Because many of
these aggregate litigation procedures are so new, they have not yet
been fully "road tested." In other words, courts have not yet had the
opportunity to figure out the intricacies of their domestic aggregate
litigation procedures, much less turn their attention to what the
existence of such aggregate procedures means for the enforcement of
U.S. class judgments.' Thus, U.S. courts looking to a foreign
country's law on aggregate litigation in their search for res judicata will
undoubtedly be left with a less-than-satisfactory answer to the
question: "Will this foreign court enforce a U.S. class judgment?" An
adequate comparison between U.S. law and foreign law on the subject
simply cannot be made.
3. "Extrinsic" vs. "Intrinsic" Grounds for Nonrecognition of a U.S.
Class Judgment
As discussed, the analysis conducted by U.S. courts in
ascertaining the res judicata effect of a U.S. judgment abroad is
complicated by the myriad potential grounds for nonenforcement as
well as the relative newness of aggregate litigation in many foreign
168. Issacharoff& Miller, supra note 101, at 191.
169. Behrens, supra note 150, at 175.
170. Id. at 173.
171. Nashi, supra note 151, at 148. For Italy's class action law, see Legge 23 luglio
2009, n. 99, art. 49, para. 14, in G.U. 31 luglio 2009, n. 176, Supplemento ordinario, n. 136
(It.).
172. Mexico Introduces Class Actions for Consumer, Financial Service, and
Envronmental Clains, CLIENT UPDATE (Chadbourne & Parke LLP), June 14, 2011, at 1,
available at http://www.chadboume.com/files/Publication/1d3edl97-6387-4da5-b4cd-4ea228
22dcdl/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/ff50f354-f29e-48de-92d6-
586b6244e497/Litigation-MexicanClassAction Riley.pdf.
173. Shapiro & Kim, supra note 14, at 44 ("[A]s foreign jurisdictions begin to decide
the extent to which they may want to reject, or embrace, aspects of the US model of class
litigation in their own jurisdictions, the results will be fluid as their jurisprudence evolves in
response to initial choices and the impact of those decisions-perhaps unforeseen-on that
jurisdiction's economic interests. In other words, there will be trial and error in these
jurisdictions that will make speculation by US courts about the expected outcomes in foreign
courts inherently unreliable.").
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jurisdictions. A further limitation on the ability of U.S. courts to
predict the eventual res judicata effect of a US. class judgment abroad
stems from the distinction between what I call "extrinsic" and
"intrinsic" grounds for nonrecognition.'74
Extrinsic grounds for nonrecognition are those that are
independent of the content and substance of the underlying class
judgment or the process by which the judgment was reached. In short,
they are "extrinsic" to the actual class judgment rendered in a
particular case. Concerns related to the opt-out class action
mechanism or to jurisdiction, for instance, do not hinge on the
particular class judgment at hand. Rather, they are general objections
to enforcement that could be raised in any transnational class action.
in contrast, intrinsic grounds for nonrecognition are those that are
inextricably intertwined with the actual judgment or settlement in a
particular case, or the process by which it was reached. "Intrinsic"
thus refers to the fact that the ground for nonrecognition originates
from the particular class judgment at hand, including the particular
way that it was reached. Intrinsic grounds for nonrecognition would
include, for instance, challenges based on deficient notice or
inadequate representation.
Courts attempting to ascertain the eventual res judicata effect of a
U.S. class judgment as part of the certification analysis necessarily
must confine their analysis to extrinsic grounds for nonrecognition:
Would the foreign court regard a U.S. court as having jurisdiction over
the parties? Is the opt-in mechanism contrary to public policy or
natural justice in the foreign state? The reason for this is obvious:
because a judgment on the merits does not yet exist, a court cannot
factor intrinsic grounds for nonrecognition into the certification
calculus.'"
However, the consequence of focusing on extrinsic grounds for
nonrecognition is that the judgment enforcement picture is incomplete.
At best, by looking at extrinsic grounds for nonrecognition, a U.S.
court may be able to conclude that there are no general obstacles to
enforcement in the foreign state. However, a U.S. court is never in a
position to predict ex ante whether the foreign court would accord res
174. Another way of conceptualizing this issue is to look at the distinction between
"general" and "fact-specific" grounds for nonrecognition.
175. Note that the certification decision is made very early in the litigation. See FED.
R. CIv. P 23(c)(1)(A) ("At an early practicable time after a person sues or is sued as a class
representative, the court must determine by order whether to certify the action as a class
action.").
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judicata to the particular class judgment at hand. This is because
additional challenges that are specific to the class judgment can always
be leveled by an absent class member after the judgment is rendered.
For instance, an absent class member may argue that the notice did not
adequately apprise him of his rights, that the notice was not adequately
disseminated, that the judgment or settlement amounts were
fundamentally unfair, that he was not adequately represented by the
named plaintiff, that he was not adequately represented by class
counsel, etc. The point is that these intrinsic grounds for
nonrecognition are not knowable by a U.S. court at the certification
stage of the analysis. They depend on the content of, and the process
surrounding, the eventual class judgment or settlement.
The court in Vivendi recognized that the ultimate enforceability
of a U.S. judgment will turn on an individualized inquiry of the class
judgment that is eventually rendered. In reference to the analysis of
whether French claimants should be included in the U.S. class, the
Southern District of New York observed:
It also bears noting that whether a foreign judgment is contrary to
international public policy will be made on an individualized case-by-
case basis, not upon an abstract comparison of U.S. and French law, or
upon consideration of an as-yet unenacted French statute. Thus the res
judcata effect of a judgment as to any particular Vivendi shareholder
will await a determination of the facts surrounding the institution of a
second action by that shareholder and, thereafter, the assertion by
Vivendi of a resju&cata defense.76
Despite this observation, the court proceeded to focus on
extrinsic grounds for nonrecognition, concluding that "it is unlikely
that a French court will decline to respect a US. judgment on the
grounds that the form of notice (mail or publication) or the method of
consent (opt-in or opt-out) offends constitutional principles, let alone
French concepts of international public policy."'" Although the
Vivendi court was attuned to the fact that the ultimate res judicata
effect of a U.S. class judgment would turn on the individual
circumstances of the case, or intrinsic grounds for nonrecognition, it
failed to appreciate the significance of this fact. If the enforceability of
every class judgment will turn on the peculiarities of a particular class
judgment and/or the process by which it was rendered, why are courts
176. Vivendi I No. 02 Civ. 5571(RJH)(HBP), 2009 WL 855799, at *12 (S.D.N.Y
Mar. 31, 2009) (citation omitted).
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attempting to predict something that is, by its very nature, incapable of
being predicted?
In short, even if a court finds, based on its consideration of
extrinsic grounds for nonrecognition, that a foreign class judgment
would likely be enforceable, there is the omnipresent chance that
intrinsic defects unique to the class judgment or settlement itself might
render it unenforceable. At most, then, a court will only be able to
predict half of the equation: whether a foreign court in general would
enforce a U.S. class judgment in a certain litigation context. The other
half of the equation-whether there are any concerns with the actual
class judgment that is actually rendered-must simply be ignored.
4. Case Study: Curme v McDonaldk
Despite the attention paid by U.S. courts to the hypothetical
enforceability of U.S. class judgments abroad, there has been very little
in the way of reported case law from foreign jurisdictions concerning
the topic."' One case that did look at the issue of the enforceability of
178. In a landmark decision handed down by the Amsterdam District Court on June
23, 2010, the Dutch court recognized a U.S. class judgment in a securities fraud case and
barred any Dutch class members who did not opt out from bringing a subsequent action. See
Rechtbank Amsterdam, 23 juni 2010, No. 398833/HA ZA 08-1465, Stichting Onderzoek
Bedrijfs Informatie Sobi/Deloitte Accountants B.V, para. 6.5.6 (Neth.). The court recognized
the U.S. judgment for three reasons: (1) the U.S. District Court entering the class judgment
had an "internationally accepted basis" for jurisdiction over the matter; (2) the U.S.
proceedings satisfied the requirements of Dutch due process; and (3) the class judgment
"survive[d] the test against Dutch public order." Id paras. 6.5.1-6.5.5; see also Rob Polak et
al., Recognition of a US. Class Action Settlement in the Netherlands (Royal Ahold N V),
LEGAL ALERT (June 28, 2010), at 1-2, available at http://www.debrauw.com/NewsfLegal
Alerts/Pages/LegalAlert-RecognitionofaUSClassActionSettlementintheNetherlands.aspx ("The
main reason for this decision was that the proceedings for a class action settlement in the U.S.
are very similar to the Netherlands' system for collective settlements. The Amsterdam
District Court found in general that the interests of the injured parties were adequately
safeguarded by the U.S. system since investors belonging to the Class can object to, and opt-
out from, a collective settlement. The Amsterdam District Court further ruled that in this
specific case the Class had sufficient time to opt out, and that the possibility to opt out and to
object had been effectively communicated to the Class (all known shareholders received an
information letter, and 65 announcements had been published in Dutch newspapers).").
On the other side of the judgment recognition issue, courts in the United Kingdom and
Germany have suggested that a U.S. class action judgment would not be recognized in those
respective countries. In Campos v Kentucky & Indiana Terminal Railroad Co., an English
court expressed uneasiness with the notion that an absent member of a U.S. class action could
be bound by a class action judgment:
[T]here is great force in [the] contention that in accordance with English private
international law a foreign judgment could not give rise to a plea of resjudicata in
the English Courts unless the party alleged to be bound had been served with the
process which led to the foreign judgment.
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a U.S. class judgment was Cume v McDonaldk Restaurants of
Canada Ltd, decided in 2005 by the Court of Appeal for Ontario.'"
Cume aptly illustrates the three points explored above: the complexity
of the enforcement analysis, the newness of the legal issues at play, and
the distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic grounds for
nonrecognition.
There are several reasons why Currie is the ideal case for
analysis. First, it emanates from a legal system that, while foreign, is
not quite so foreign. Canada and the U.S. share a common legal
heritage, including similar views on procedural and substantive
fairness. Second, Canada has wholeheartedly embraced the class
action mechanism.' Most Canadian provinces have enacted
legislation governing class actions,"' and even those provinces that do
not specifically provide for class actions via statute are still able to
conduct class proceedings under the auspices of their joinder rules.'82
Moreover, the Canadian statutory framework for class actions is
modeled largely on Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
While there are differences in terms of certification requirements,' 3 the
(1962) 2 Lloyd's List L.R. 459 (Q.B.) at 473 (Eng.); see Jonathan E. Richman, Transnational
Class Actions and Judgment Recognition, 11 Class Action Litig. Rep. (BNA) No. 583, at 7
(June 25, 2010), available at http://www.deweyleboeuf.com/-/media/Files/attorneyarticles/
2010/20100628_CALReport.ashx (discussing the Campos case). Similarly, a German court
has suggested that a U.S. class action judgment, "[a]t least to the extent it involves [a]
[p]laintiff without his active participation[,]" would not be afforded recognition in Germany
because recognition of such a judgment would violate public policy. Landgericht [LG]
[Stuttgart Regional Court] Nov. 24, 1999, 24 IPRAx 240 (241) 2001 (Ger.). Instead, in order
for a U.S. class action judgment to be recognized in Germany, "The applicable law would
have to provide that all members of the class, without exception, must be informed of the
action." Id. at 241-42; see also Richman, supra, at 6 (discussing this case).
179. [2005] 74 O.R. 3d 321 (Can. Ont. C.A.). For a discussion of the Curie case, see
Genevieve Saumier, USA-Canada Class Actions: Trading n Procedural Fairness, 5 GLOBAL
JURIST ADvANCES, at 1, 8 (2005), available athttp://ssrn.com/abstract-753344.
180. W Canadian Shopping Ctrs., Inc. v. Dutton, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 534, para. 26 (Can.)
("The class action plays an important role in today's world. The rise of mass production, the
diversification of corporate ownership, the advent of the mega-corporation, and the
recognition of environmental wrongs have all contributed to its growth.... The class action
offers a means of efficiently resolving such disputes in a manner that is fair to all parties.").
181. For the Ontario class action statute, see Class Proceedings Act, 1992, S.O. 1992,
c. 6 (Can.). For the Qu6bec statute, see An Act Respecting the Class Action, R.S.Q. 2000, c.
R-2.1 (Can.). Only Prince Edward Island has not yet enacted legislation governing class
proceedings.
182. Dutton, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 534, para. 34 (determining that absent provincial class
proceedings legislation, "courts must determine the availability of the class action and the
mechanics of class action practice").
183. For instance, Canadian courts do not require common issues to "predominate"
over individual issues. See Watson, supra note 167, at 272-73 ("The procedures provided by
the legislation in each of the three provinces are structurally similar to those prescribed by
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standard for the certification of settlement classes," and the
receptiveness of Canadian courts to mass tort class actions,' the basic
framework governing class proceedings is similar. Third, Cmie deals
with a discrete consumer protection issue. The case was not a
complicated one involving mass torts or securities fraud, with multiple
and perhaps novel causes of action. Currie was a run-of-the-mill
consumer protection case where enforceability issues should not have
been overly complex.
Based on these factors, one would expect that if a U.S. class
judgment were to be enforced, it would be in a context such as this-
where the enforcing court shares a similar legal tradition and embraces
the class action mechanism and where the judgment itself is based on a
discrete and widely recognized common law cause of action. Taken a
step further, if it were possible for a U.S. court to predict the ultimate
res judicata effect of its own judgment, one would expect it to be able
to do so in a case such as this. Yet, it is unlikely that the U.S. court,
even if it had turned its mind to the eventual enforceability of its own
judgment, would have been able to predict the judgment's res judicata
effect.
The Cunie case arose from allegations of impropriety by the co-
defendants, McDonald's Corporation and Simon Marketing, in the
sponsoring and running of numerous promotional games or contests in
McDonald's restaurants between 1995 and 2001.' On August 21,
2001, a number of individuals were indicted for embezzling prizes
allocated to McDonald's games. The next day, a class action complaint
Rule 23 of the U.S. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, although in certain respects the
Canadian legislation is more libeml in facilitating class actions than its American
counterpart.... The Canadian criteria for certification of a proceeding as a class action are
relatively undemanding." (footnotes omitted)); Gordon McKee & Robin Linley, The
Evolving Landscape for Pharmaceutical Product Liability Litigation in Canada, 73 DEF.
CouNs. J. 242, 243 (2006) ("Accordingly, the test for class certification is generally
considered to be lower in Canada than in the U.S.").
184. Canadian courts apply a lower threshold than their U.S. counterparts in certifying
a class for settlement purposes. See Gariepy v. Shell Oil Co., [2002] O.J. No. 4022, para. 27
(Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.) ("The requirements for certification in a settlement context are the
same as they are in a litigation context and are set out in section 5 of the Class Proceedings
Act, 1992. However, their application need not, in my view, be as rigorously applied in the
settlement context as they should be in the litigation context, principally because the
underlying concerns over the manageability of the ongoing proceeding are removed.").
185. Canadian courts appear more willing than U.S. courts to certify mass tort class
actions. See, eg., McKee & Linley, supra note 183, at 244 ("Overall, the current trend in
mass tort litigation in Canada continues to be towards class actions, and those involving
product liability have been certified more often than not.'").
186. Currie v. McDonald's Rests. of Can. Ltd. [2005] 74 O.R. 3d 321, 325, para. 3
(Can. Ont. C.A.).
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was filed in Illinois in the name of the representative plaintiff, Boland,
on behalf of "all customers of McDonald's who paid money for
McDonald's food products in order to receive a subject contest game
piece for subject contest promotions between 1995 and the present."'"
Settlement discussions ensued and ultimately culminated in a
settlement agreement between the plaintiffs and defendants on April
19, 2002, that was preliminarily approved by the Illinois court.
Some months later, a group of Canadians moved for leave to
intervene in the Boland proceedings to object to the settlement of that
action. On January 3, 2003, the Illinois court dismissed the objections
of the Canadian objectors and approved the final terms of the
settlement and certification order. On April 8, 2003, the formal order
of the court was entered purporting to bind all members of the class
who had not opted out of the proceeding. Two of the Canadian
objectors, Parsons and Currie, then sought to bring separate class
proceedings in Ontario in respect of the claims that had been settled in
the Boland action. The motions judge dismissed Parsons' action,
reasoning that by voluntarily appearing as an objector in Boland
Parsons had necessarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the Illinois
court.'" The motions judge, however, refused to stay or dismiss the
Curie action, holding for a variety of reasons that the Boland
judgment should not be recognized and enforced in Ontario. The
defendant then appealed the motions judge's decision to the Ontario
Court of Appeal.
In Currie, the Ontario Court of Appeal was asked to enforce an
Illinois settlement of a class action that included Canadian class
members. The court noted that the central issue was precisely the one
that US. courts are concerned with: "whether the [U.S.] judgment is
binding so as to preclude [the Ontario class member's] proposed class
action in Ontario."'" The Ontario Court of Appeal observed that
Canadian rules for the recognition and enforcement of judgments
needed to take into account certain unique features of class action
proceedings.'" In particular, the court noted that principles of personal
jurisdiction needed to be adapted to the international class context.
187. Class Action Complaint at 135 Boland v. Simon Marketing, Inc., No.
01CH13803 (Ill. Cir. Aug. 22, 2001), 2001 WL 34396099. Note that numerous class
complaints were filed in various jurisdictions, but where ultimately consolidated by way of
MDL proceedings in Cook County, Illinois.
188. Curne, 74 0.R. 3d 327, para. 5.
189. Id. at 325, 327, paras. 2, 6-7.
190. Id. at 300, para. 16. For a general description of Canadian law on the
enforcement ofjudgments, see Monestier, supma note 115.
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Specifically, the court analyzed how the principles of "real and
substantial connection" and "order and fairness"-the jurisdictional
tests applied to out-of-province defendants-translated to nonresident
class plaintiffs.
Sharpe J.A. observed that there was a real and substantial
connection between the nonresident plaintiff class and the judgment
forum, Illinois, because the defendant had its head office in Illinois
and the alleged wrong had been committed there.19' However, the
factual connections between Illinois and the nonresident plaintiff class
did not end the inquiry. The Ontario Court of Appeal emphasized that
the principles of order and fairness required that careful consideration
be paid to the rights of nonresident class members, who would have no
reason to expect that any legal claim arising from a consumer
transaction that took place entirely within Ontario and that gave rise to
damages in Ontario would be litigated in the United States. In order to
address the concern for fairness, the Ontario Court of Appeal
considered it helpful to review "the adequacy of the procedural rights
afforded [to] the unnamed non-resident class members in the [Illinois]
action.""9 In particular, "Respect for procedural rights, including the
adequacy of representation, the adequacy of notice and the right to opt
out, could fortify the connection with Illinois jurisdiction and alleviate
concerns regarding unfairness."'" Sharpe J.A. thus concluded that "it
may be appropriate to attach jurisdictional consequences to an
unnamed plaintiff's failure to opt out" in circumstances where "there is
a real and substantial connection linking the cause of action to the
foreign jurisdiction, . . . the [interests] of non-resident class members
are adequately represented, and ... non-resident class members are
accorded procedural fairness."'94  Even though the court was of the
view that a real and substantial connection existed between the
nonresident plaintiff class and Illinois, it held that the judgment should
not be enforced because the notice provided to the Ontario class was
inadequate.'
191. Curne, 74 O.R. 3d 330, 332, paras. 16, 22-24.
192. Id. at 333, para. 25.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 334, para. 30.
195. Id. at 335, para. 31. The Ontario Court of Appeal observed that because of its
conclusion that notice was inadequate, it did not need to consider the adequacy of
representation in any detail. However, the court noted that transnational class actions may
raise issues of inadequate representation:
In the circumstances of this case, it is not necessary for me to consider the
issue of adequacy of representation in detail. I note, however, that American
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In terms of the content of the notice, the Ontario Court of Appeal
affirmed the motions judge's findings that "the wording of the notice
was so technical and obscure that the ordinary class member would
have difficulty understanding the implications of the proposed
settlement on their legal rights in Canada or that they had the right to
opt out."'" The court also affirmed the motions judge's conclusion that
the mode of notice was inadequate, noting evidence that suggested that
the Canadian notice had reached only 29.9% of the Canadian class,
while the corresponding American notice had reached 72% of the U.S.
class. In light of these conclusions on notice, the Ontario Court of
Appeal refused to accord res judicata effect to the U.S. judgment and
permitted the absent class member to proceed with litigation in
Canada.'"
Curwe illustrates the three interrelated structural restrictions on
the search for res judicata described above: the complexity of the
recognition analysis, the newness of the legal issues at play, and the
importance of intrinsic grounds for nonrecognition. First, Curne
shows the complexity of foreign recognition law by showcasing
myriad possible grounds for nonenforcement: jurisdiction, adequacy
of representation, adequacy of notice, and abuse of process. Each of
these potential bases for nonrecognition of a U.S. class judgment must
be analyzed through a distinctively Canadian jurisprudential lens. So,
it does not suffice, for instance, to say that a "real and substantial
connection" appears to exist without an appreciation of the underlying
constitutional doctrine of personal jurisdiction articulated by the
Supreme Court of Canada in Morguard Investments Ltd v De Savoye
and its progeny.'" Nor does it suffice to say that notice would be
commentators have raised the "race-to-the bottom" concern .... A sophisticated
defendant may persuade plaintiffs' counsel to accept a sharply discounted recovery
rate for non-resident (including Canadian or Ontario) plaintiffs. The foreign
representative plaintiff's interests may conflict with those of the Ontario class, or
not fully encapsulate the interests of the Ontario class. Recognition and
enforcement rules must be attentive to these possibilities and retain sufficient
flexibility to address concerns of this nature.
Id. at 333, para. 26 (citation omitted).
196. Id. at 336, para. 39.
197. According to the Ontario Court of Appeal, the "notice" issue was relevant both to
the issue ofjurisdiction and the defense of natural justice. Id at 336-38, paras. 35, 38, 42-43,
46.
198. [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1077 (Can.). The Morguardcase is the seminal decision on the
issue of personal jurisdiction in Canada.
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adequate by American standards; what matters is the standards
Canadian courts would apply in these circumstances.'
Second, Cumre illustrates that even in a country with a relatively
lengthy history of class action litigation, courts are still working out
some critical legal issues. In other words, while class actions are not
new in Canada, many of the attendant legal issues are. Notably, the
question of whether, and when, it is appropriate for a court in one
province to purport to bind plaintiffs resident in another province is
still an unanswered one. Canadian courts have accepted that a court in
one province has personal jurisdiction over a class member in another
province where there is a "real and substantial connection" between
the plaintiff class and the adjudicating forum. Unfortunately, courts
are still struggling to define the content of the real and substantial
connection that provides the jurisdictional "hook" to enable the
adjudicating forum to render a judgment binding on nonresident class
members.2 Divergent approaches have developed with respect to the
real and substantial connection test as it applies to a nonresident
plaintiff class.20' Some courts have merely required that there be an
issue common to all class members, resident and nonresident, to find
jurisdiction; that commonality, in itself, supplies the real and
199. Notably, Cwrie demonstrates that the standards cannot necessarily be ascertained
by looking to "the law on the books." The defendants in Cumie had argued:
[T]he motion judge erred in law by applying a higher standard to the notice than
would be applied in [a corresponding] Ontario class action. They point[ed] out that
under Ontario law, there is no absolute requirement for effective notice in class
actions and, where the stakefs] [are] extremely low, notice requirements may be
tailored accordingly.
74 O.R. 3d 337, para. 41.
The Ontario Court of Appeal rejected this argument, stating:
In assessing the fairness of the foreign proceedings, "the courts of this country
must have regard to fundamental principles of justice and not to the letter of the
rules which, either in our system, or in the relevant foreign system, are designed to
give effect to those principles". The adequacy of the notice had to be assessed in
terms of what is required in an international class action involving the assertion of
jurisdiction against non-residents. While Ontario's domestic standard may have
some bearing upon that issue, I do not agree that it is conclusive ....
Id. para. 42 (citation omitted).
200. See Craig Jones & Angela Baxter, Fwnbling Toward Efficacy: Interwisdictional
Class Actions Afier Currie v. McDonald's, 3 CAN. CLASS ACTiON REv. 405, 405-06 (2006)
("[The] decisions seem to unequivocally confirm the conceptof interjurisdictional classes (in
the past the subject of some controversy), they do leave some important questions
unanswered as to when such classes are permissible.").
201. For a thorough discussion of the issue of jurisdiction in the multijurisdictional
class context in Canada, see Tanya J. Monestier, Personal Jwisdiction over Non-Resident
ClassMembers: Have We Gone Down the WrongRoad., 45 TEX. INT'L L.J. 537 (2010).
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substantial connection sufficient to assert jurisdiction over nonresident
class members. Other courts have insisted that there be an actual link,
in the sense of a nexus, between the nonresident plaintiff class and the
adjudicating forum in order to ground jurisdiction. In short, there is no
clear pronouncement of what constitutes a "real and substantial"
connection between the forum and the nonresident class-whether that
nonresident class be domestic or international. The point here is that
Canadian courts have not yet "figured out" all the details of class
judgment recognition even within Canada. If this is the case, how are
U.S. courts positioned to ascertain the eventual res judicata effect of an
American class judgment in Canada?
Finally, the Cumie case highlights the distinction between
extrinsic and intrinsic grounds for nonrecognition and the ultimate
impossibility of predicting the res judicata effect of a U.S. class
judgment ex ante. While a U.S. court might have been able to predict
at the certification stage of the inquiry that, in principle, a Canadian
court would enforce a judgment like this, it could never have predicted
whether a Canadian court would enforce this partcularjudgment The
inadequacy of the content of the notice as well as the inadequacy of its
dissemination (both intrinsic to the class judgment) were not knowable
by a U.S. court ex ante. Thus, Cumie highlights that the eventual
enforceability of a judgment will ultimately turn on the particular class
judgment or settlement at hand. There will always be a multitude of
questions that can only be answered after the class judgment or
settlement is rendered: What percentage of the class received notice?
Where was notice published? Were there other notices that may have
interfered with the ability of the class to understand their rights? Was
the representative plaintiff adequate? Was class counsel adequate?
How did domestic claimants fare vis-a-vis foreign claimants? Was the
content of the judgment/settlement fair? As such, predicting at a broad
level of generality that a Canadian court would enforce a U.S. class
judgment (to the extent that this can be predicted) does not appreciably
advance the res judicata analysis when there are so many ex post
challenges that can be directed at a class judgment.
My objective for this Part of the Article was to call into question
the current practice of US. courts attempting to predict the res judicata
effect of their own judgments abroad. While the goal may be
laudable-that is, to ensure that defendants are not exposed to the risk
of relitigation abroad-the practice itself is suspect. In particular,
certain litigation and structural dynamics of class actions prevent a
U.S. court from accurately assessing the res judicata issues at play. It
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appears that U.S. courts are simply venturing a "best guess" at whether
a given foreign court would generally enforce a U.S. class judgment,
and a best guess is not an appropriate basis upon which to determine
whether foreign claimants should be part of a U.S. transnational class
action.
Given the inherent limitations associated with divining the
ultimate preclusive effects of a U.S. class judgment abroad, Rule 23's
superiority requirement should not be read to require courts to engage
in a speculative res judicata analysis as a predicate to certification of a
class action containing foreign claimants. Rule 23(b)(3)(C) provides
that "the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of
the claims in the particular forum" is a relevant consideration in
assessing whether "a class action is superior to other available methods
for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy."2 2 The section
must rest on the assumption that the desirability of concentrating
litigation in the chosen forum-as opposed to a foreign forum-can
be ascertained. In other words, this section contemplates that courts
can make a reasonably informed decision as to the "pros" and "cons"
of having litigation proceed in the forum court. Where such a decision
cannot be made, owing to the speculative nature of the inquiry, the
superiority requirement should not be read to encompass a
consideration of whether a foreign court would grant preclusive effect
to a U.S. class judgment.
That is not to say, of course, that preclusion concerns are
unimportant. Indeed, they are of paramount importance to the parties.
Accordingly, in the next Part, I turn toward establishing the
groundwork for a more principled approach to the inclusion of foreign
class members in U.S. class actions.
IV. THE CASE FOR AN OPT-IN CLASS ACTION: TOWARD A
PRINCIPLED APPROACH TO THE INCLUSION OF FOREIGN
PLAINTIFFS IN U.S. TRANSNATIONAL CLASS ACTIONS
Above, I discussed the restrictions placed on the search for res
judicata by both the litigation and structural dynamics of class
litigation. In short, I have argued that the practice of courts attempting
to predict the eventual res judicata effect of a U.S. class judgment will
fail to yield any definitive answers, and as such is not an appropriate
method of assessing the "superiority" of a transnational class
proceeding. However, if the preclusive effect of a U.S. class judgment
202. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(C), 23(b)(3).
6 0 [ Vol . 8 6: 1
TRANSNA TIONAL CLASS ACTIONS
is not the relevant touchstone in the Rule 23 superiority inquiry, what
should be? Simply put, how should courts assess whether and when to
include foreign claimants in US. class actions? It is submitted that the
best approach is also the simplest: avoiding the res judicata problem
altogether. Courts can do this by interpreting Rule 23 to allow for an
opt-in mechanism for foreign claimants, such that they will only be
bound by the result of a U.S. class judgment if they affirmatively
consent to participate in the litigation.203
This Part proceeds in three sections. First, I examine what I call
the "so what?" issue. That is, even if it is not possible to predict the
eventual res judicata effect of a U.S. judgment in a foreign court, what
is the harm in including foreign class members in a U.S. class action
and then letting the foreign court deal with preclusion issues down the
road?" Next, I discuss the Rule 23 legal framework and argue that
Rule 23 should be read to allow for the creation of opt-in class actions
for foreign claimants; alternatively, the Rule should be amended to
expressly provide for this possibility. Finally, I argue that an opt-in
regime presents a more principled way of determining foreign
claimants' class membership in a US. class action because an opt-in
class action eliminates the res judicata problem altogether, allows all
foreign claimants to participate in US. litigation if they so choose,
provides additional protections for absent foreign claimants, respects
international comity, and sufficiently deters defendant misconduct.
A. The "So What?"Issue
Even accepting the premise of my argument in Part ifi-that it is
impossible to predict with any degree of certainty the eventual res
judicata effect of a US. class judgment abroad--one might still
203. In practice, this would mean a hybrid regime, whereby U.S. claimants would
participate in Rule 23 under an opt-out regime and non-U.S. claimants would participate
under an opt-in regime. For a similar model in the domestic Canadian context, see Class
Proceedings Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 50, § 16 (Can.).
204. Bermann puts the point as follows:
Arguably, a U.S. court should not care whether a future adverse judgment in
the class action will be granted preclusive effect in subsequent litigation abroad.
For any number of practical reasons, such litigation is not likely to be brought, and
so predicting the preclusive effect of the U.S. judgment may be an entirely
academic exercise. Even if such subsequent litigation were probable, the U.S.
court need not really care; it could simply go ahead and run the risk of including
large numbers of persons in the class action, as against whom the resulting
judgment may not be resjudicata at a later date in their home court. What is there
to lose?
Bermann, supm note 1, at 95.
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wonder what the harm is in continuing the practice. In other words, is
it really that objectionable that US. courts attempt to "weed out"
claimants from foreign jurisdictions that would likely not enforce a
US. class judgment and then presumptively bind (or purport to bind)
foreigners from jurisdictions that may enforce class judgments?
Despite its shortcomings, is this still not the best way to expand the
perceived benefits of U.S.-style class actions while balancing
defendants' concerns about relitigation? It is submitted that the answer
to this question is a resounding "no."
The practice of differentiating between foreign claimants on the
basis of whether a U.S. court believes that their home courts would
enforce an eventual judgment is unsound in principle. Ultimately, the
inclusion of foreign claimants in U.S. class actions is designed to
facilitate access to justice. It has been said that owing to the
inadequacy of aggregation procedures and substantive remedies
abroad, the U.S. provides the most viable forum in which plaintiffs,
both foreign and domestic, can realize some meaningful form of
redress.205 If the purpose behind including foreign claimants in U.S.
class actions is to provide foreign claimants with access to justice, then
distinguishing between litigants from different countries based on a
"guess" as to whether a foreign court would enforce a U.S. class
judgment is nothing short of arbitrary. In order to facilitate access to
justice, all foreign claimants who are aggrieved must be able to
participate in a US. class proceeding, not simply those who hail from a
jurisdiction that a U.S. court assumes will likely enforce a class
judgment. Fundamentally, then, the approach that courts are currently
using to ascertain foreign claimants' membership in a U.S. class action
undermines one of the fundamental purposes of including foreign
claimants in a U.S. proceeding in the first place: to provide all
similarly situated claimants with an appropriate form of redress.
Further, by purporting to bind foreign claimants whose home
jurisdictions U.S. courts consider would be receptive to enforcing a
US. class judgment, U.S. courts may actually be thwarting foreign
claimants' ability to access justice. This is because an absent foreign
class member who is seeking to litigate a claim in a foreign
jurisdiction that has been purportedly resolved in a US. class
proceeding now has an additional obstacle to overcome: that of an
already existing class judgment that may or may not be res judicata as
205. Buschkin, supnr note 6, at 1598-99 ("[F]oreign claimants rarely have an adequate
remedy outside of the class device or a realistic and practical way to relitigate the same case
in a foreign court. . . .).
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to the class member's claims. Thus, absent foreign class members will
now have to address a complicated threshold issue of whether they are
entitled to proceed in the foreign jurisdiction or whether their claims
are barred owing to their apparent inclusion in a U.S. class action. The
Cutrie case, described above, is a clear illustration of this point. The
plaintiffs in Crie were forced to first litigate the issue of whether
their action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata because of the
prior Illinois proceedings. Because Curlie was appealed to the Ontario
Court of Appeal, it took over two years to settle this threshold issue,
such that the Ontario plaintiffs could finally proceed with the
underlying claim.206 This additional obstacle for foreign claimants
seeking to proceed with claims in their home jurisdiction increases
litigation costs, is time consuming, and detracts from the overall
objective of plaintiffs seeking vindication of their rights.
Finally, an ad hoc and speculative determination of whether or
not foreign plaintiffs are included in U.S. class actions is also
undesirable from the vantage point of defendants. The inclusion of
foreign claimants in a U.S. class action will undoubtedly increase the
settlement value of the action without providing what the defendant
wants most: an assurance of finality.207 Assume, for instance, that a
defendant would settle a purely domestic class action for $100 million;
assume further that after claimants from several foreign jurisdictions
(England, France, and Italy) are included in the class action, the
settlement value of the action increases to $130 million. The
settlement is funded and the relevant payments are made.
Subsequently, courts in all three foreign countries refuse to accord
preclusive effect to the U.S. settlement and permit relitigation of the
claim (perhaps in some sort of aggregate form). In such
circumstances, the defendant will have overpaid to settle the claim by
$30 million based on the assumption that claims in these three
jurisdictions would be settled.208 Premising class membership-and
thus, ultimate settlement values-on a precarious prediction as to the
res judicata effect of a U.S. judgment abroad makes little economic
sense from the perspective of the defendant.
206. The Boland settlement was approved in January 2003, and the Curne case was
decided by the Court of Appeal in February 2005. Currie v. McDonald's Rests. of Can. Ltd.
[20051 74 OR. 3d 321, 326-27 para. 3 (Can. Ont. C.A.).
207. See Saparoff & Beattie, supra note 12, at 680-81 ("[T]he recent attempts by
defendants to exclude [foreign] plaintiffs from class actions obviously are motivated by the
desire to greatly reduce the settlement value of the class remaining.").
208. Note that the economic calculus may be different in situations where the
defendant is seeking to certify a settlement class. See supra Part Hl.A.3; infra Part IVC.3.
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In short, there are compelling reasons why U.S. courts should not
simply venture a best guess as to the eventual preclusive effect of a
class judgment and let another court deal with the issue down the road.
Whether plaintiffs are included or excluded in a U.S. class action
matters to the parties and impacts litigation decisions; therefore, it will
not suffice to include foreign claimants in the mere hope that a foreign
court would accord res judicata effect to an eventual judgment.
B. Opt-In ClassActions Under Rule 23
In Part III, I discussed the problems associated with the practice
of U.S. courts trying to divine the ultimate res judicata effect of a class
judgment abroad as a means to deciding which foreign claimants
should be included within a U.S. transnational class action. A more
principled way of deciding whether foreign claimants should be
included in a U.S. proceeding would be to adopt an opt-in mechanism
for foreign claimants.209 As such, only foreign class members who
affirmatively decide that they wish to be part of a U.S. class action
would be included within the class. In this Part, I discuss whether an
opt-in regime is permissible under Rule 23 and argue that the Rule
should be interpreted to allow for such a possibility. In the alternative,
I suggest that Rule 23 be amended to expressly allow for courts to craft
opt-in regimes for foreign claimants. This will define the parameters
of my argument that an opt-in regime presents a more principled way
of including foreign claimants in U.S. class actions.
Rule 23 does not speak to the issue of whether foreign claimants
may be included in U.S. class actions, much less the issue of whether
they should be permitted to opt into, rather than opt out of, an
American class proceeding. At least one district court, however, saw
the wisdom in crafting an opt-in regime under Rule 23 in a case
involving predominantly foreign plaintiffs. In re Sk Tm Fire ir
Kaprun, Austia involved litigation brought in the United States by the
surviving family members of passengers killed in a ski train fire in
Austria.210 Of the 155 passengers that were killed, only eight were
209. An alternative solution would be to exclude foreign claimants from participating
in U.S. class actions altogether. In fact, Murtagh suggests that where U.S. courts are unable to
determine accurately the res judicata effect of a judgment, foreign claimants should be
presumptively excluded from a U.S. class action. Murtagh, supra note 7, at 32. It is
submitted that while outright exclusion would certainly solve the res judicata problem
identified above, the solution might be overly restrictive, ultimately thwarting the fairness,
efficiency, and deterrence goals underlying class actions.
210. 220 F.R.D. 195, 199 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), rv Kern v. Siemens Corp., 393 F.3d 120
(2d Cir. 2004).
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American. The Southern District of New York certified a class
consisting of "all heirs, beneficiaries and personal representatives of
all individuals who died in the fire who consent to inclusion." 2"
Because participation in the class required prospective class members
to consent to be bound by the judgment, the certification was one of an
opt-in class (rather than a traditional opt-out class) under Rule
23(b)(3). The court explained that an opt-in class ameliorates "the
potential preclusion problems by conditioning participation in this
class action on each class member's agreement to be bound by a final
determination on the merits." 212 Consequently, defendants could be
assured finality in the event that there is a finding of no liability in the
United States. 213 The court held that an opt-in class was necessary
because it would be unfair to presumptively include members in a
class that would require a waiver of their right to sue defendants in a
foreign jurisdiction.214 While acknowledging that no direct precedent
existed for the creation of such a class, the court was of the view that
there was nothing in the rule or the jurisprudence that foreclosed such
a possibility.215 The court noted that its authority to certify an opt-in
class derived from its equitable powers.216
The Second Circuit in Kern v Siemens Corp. reversed the district
court's decision that an opt-in class was authorized under Rule
23(b)(3), stating:
The language of Rule 23 does not, however, require members of any
class affirmatively to opt into membership. Nor is such an "opt in"
provision required by due process considerations.
Not only is an "opt in" provision not required, but substantial legal
authority supports the view that by adding the "opt out" requirement to
Rule 23 in the 1966 amendments, Congress prohibited "opt in"
provisions by implication."'
After discussing the relevant case law, the court concluded that it
could not "envisage any circumstances when Rule 23 would authorize
an 'opt in' class in the liability stage of a litigation."218
Certainly, as the Second Circuit pointed out, an opt-in mechanism
for foreign claimants is difficult to reconcile with the plain wording of
211. Id. at 199 (internal quotation marks omitted).
212. Id. at 209.
213. Id.
214. Id at 209-10.
215. Id. at 210.
216. Id.
217. Kern v. Siemens Corp., 393 F.3d 120, 124, 126 (2d Cir. 2004) (citation omitted).
218. Id at 128.
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Rule 23, which provides: "[A]ny class certified under Rule 23(b)(3)
... must concisely and clearly state in plain, easily understood
language .. . that the court will exclude from the class any member
who requests exclusion."219 However, it should be considered that Rule
23 was drafted nearly half a century ago without foreign claimants in
mind. Courts should be able to interpret Rule 23 flexibly and with an
understanding of the additional complexity posed by the presence of
foreign claimants. Foreign claimants should not have American
procedures thrust upon them, and their legal rights potentially
compromised, without some sort of affirmative "say" in the decision.
The latest draft of the American Law Institute's (ALI) Principles
of Aggregate Litigation supports the view that there may be situations
that warrant the creation of an opt-in regime under Rule 23 .22 As such,
the ALI proposes § 2.10, which provides: "Aggregation By Consent[:]
When justice so requires, a court may authorize aggregate treatment of
related claims or of a common issue by affirmative consent of each
affected claimant."2 1
The comment to § 2.10 recognizes that the section is intended to
create, "in the parlance of class-action law, an 'opt-in' proceeding" in
certain "exceptional" circumstances. 222 The comment further notes that
such an exceptional situation might arise "when litigation takes place
in the United States but primarily involves claimants located in foreign
countries."223 The reporters' notes elaborate on the desirability of opt-
in regimes in certain circumstances, pointing to existing statutes that
authorize representative actions on an opt-in basis in certain substan-
tive areas such as employment law. The reporters' notes also take issue
with the Second Circuit's decision in Kern-. "This Section rejects the
result in Kern that an opt-in class is per se impermissible under the
current Rule 23 and, instead, would provide courts with authority to
create opt-in mechanisms for voluntary aggregation of claimants by
their affirmative consent."224 However, the reporters' notes proceed to
acknowledge that "[o]n the assumption that the Kern court properly
219. Id. at 124 n.5 (alterations in original) (emphasis added) (quoting FED. R. Civ P 23
(c)(2)(B)).
220. Am. LAw INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIG. § 2.10 (2010). The
AL's project "provide[s] the framework for recommended law reform (in the area of
aggregate litigation] and ... language suitable for inclusion in statutes or rules." Id intro.
221. Id.§2.10.
222. Id 2.10 cmt. a.
223. Id.
224. Id § 2.10 reporters' notes, cmt. a.
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read the current Rule 23, rule amendment would suffice for this
purpose."225
Indeed, it may be preferable to codify an opt-in regime for foreign
claimants in Rule 23, rather than rely exclusively on courts to fashion
opt-in regimes on an ad hoc basis. An amended Rule 23 could provide
guidance on the circumstances in which opt-in regimes are permitted
(or mandated), how such opt-in regimes will work in respect of foreign
claimants, the logistics of notice, and other related details.
C An Opt-In Class Offers a Pnncipled Way ofIncluding Foreign
Class Members in a US Class Action
In this Part, I argue that an opt-in mechanism for foreign
plaintiffs would provide several advantages over the current opt-out
mechanism: it would eliminate the res judicata problem altogether; it
would allow all foreign claimants to participate in U.S. litigation if they
so choose; it would provide additional due process protections for
absent foreign claimants; it would respect international comity; and it
would sufficiently deter defendant misconduct.
1. An Opt-In Class Action Eliminates the Res Judicata Problem and
Allows the Benefits of U.S. Litigation To Be Available to All
Foreign Claimants
An opt-in mechanism for foreign claimants would avoid
altogether the res judicata problems that plague US. courts in
determining whether to certify a class including foreign claimants.
This is because a foreign claimant who has affirmatively consented to
be bound to a result (through the act of opting in) cannot later
challenge the authority of the adjudicating court to render a decision
that is binding on him. Most foreign jurisdictions would regard the
foreign claimant's consent to the U.S. class proceeding as sufficient to
preclude any subsequent action by him.226
An opt-in class proceeding also addresses the concern that
similarly situated foreign claimants will be treated differently based
solely on the happenstance of their home countries' rules on judgment
enforcement (or, more accurately, what a US. court determines those
rules to be). The perceived advantages of U.S. class actions would be
225. Id.
226. In an exceptional case, a plaintiff might still be able to argue that some defect
intrinsic to the class proceeding violated natural justice or public policy, and thus, he should
not be bound to the U.S. judgment.
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available to all foreign claimants who share a commonality of interest
with U.S. claimants, not simply those who hail from jurisdictions that a
U.S. court believes will enforce an eventual US class judgment.227
In short, an opt-in mechanism for foreign claimants is the
simplest solution to the res judicata problems that plague transnational
class actions. In addition to ensuring eventual enforceability of a U.S.
class judgment through the act of consenting to the jurisdiction of a
U.S court, the opt-in mechanism has the additional advantage of being
equitable vis-d-vis the claimant class.
2. An Opt-In Class Action for Foreign Claimants Better Comports
with Due Process than an Opt-Out Class Action
Further, some commentators argue that due process may actually
require that foreign claimants opt into, rather than opt out of, a class
action as a means of evidencing their consent to a U.S. proceeding.228
In the purely domestic context, Shutts holds that plaintiffs are provided
with adequate due process where they are afforded notice, adequate
representation at all times, and an opportunity to opt out of the class
action. In such circumstances, it is said that plaintiffs who fail to opt
out of the class proceeding have impliedly consented to the jurisdiction
of the adjudicating court. It has been suggested that in the
transnational class context, these protections-notice, adequate
representation, and opportunity to opt out-are insufficient to afford
foreign claimants adequate due process.
In Shutts, the Supreme Court held that notice "must be the best
practicable, 'reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to
apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action."'229 Many
commentators have questioned the effectiveness of notice as a means
227. Given the costs and efforts associated with notifying and recruiting foreign
claimants (discussed nfra Part IVC.2), one might surmise that one consequence of an opt-in
proposal is that plaintiffs' attorneys may limit the class definition to those countries with
significant numbers of people affected. Thus, while in theory, the benefits to U.S.-style
aggregation are available to foreign claimants, in reality, only select foreign litigants will be
permitted to opt into a U.S. proceeding. However, this situation is really no different than that
which exists at present: plaintiffs' counsel will always fashion a class definition that includes
or excludes foreign claimants based, at least in part, on a financial cost/benefit analysis.
228. This argument is advanced in detail by Debra Lyn Bassett, supra note 6, at 88,
and in Implied "Consent" to Pefsonal Juisdiction in Tnwsnational Class Litigation, see
Bassett, supra note 60, at 639-41.
229. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985) (quoting Mullane v.
Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950)).
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of apprising class members of their rights.230 Class action notices tend
to be lengthy, confusing, and full of legal jargon.23' They have been
said to be "incomprehensible" to the average reader and in fact
designed to "encourage nonappearance." 23 2 Moreover, "Class members
do not naturally understand concepts in class actions. The [Federal
Judicial Committee] conducted research on laypersons' understanding
of class action notices and found that even the terms 'class' and 'class
action' often confused people."233 Aside from the content of the class
notice, adequate dissemination of class action notice is also a
problem.234
Notice, however, takes on an added dimension in the
transnational class context. Debra Lyn Bassett elaborates:
As unintelligible as a legal notice may seem to a U.S. citizen, a
foreign citizen is likely to find it even more so. Language issues can
arise when a non-English speaker receives a class action notice printed
in English. Language issues can also arise even when the class action
notice is printed in the foreign claimant's native language. "As anyone
who has ever tried to translate a document from a foreign language
knows, a literal word-by-word, or even sentence-by-sentence,
translation of a foreign document will at best confuse ... and at worst
produce nonsense."
230. On notice generally, see Robert H. Klonoff et al., Making Class Actions Work:
The Untapped Potential of the Internet, 69 U. PIT. L. REV 727 (2008); Arthur R. Miller,
Problems of Giving Notice in Class Actions, 58 F.R.D. 313 (1973); Brian Walters, "Best
Notice Practicable"in the Twenty-First Century, 2003 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 4.
231. RULE 23(c)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure now includes a "plain
language" notice requirement: "For any class certified under Rule 23(b)(3), the court must
direct to class members the best notice that is practicable under the circumstances, including
individual notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable effort. The notice
must clearly and concisely state in plain, easily understood language . . . ." FED. R. Civ. P.
23(c)(2). Additionally, the Federal Judicial Center has recently promulgated a class action
notice checklist and plain language guide to instruct judges and attorneys on the necessary
steps to ensure that this "plain language" notice requirement is fully satisfied in each case.
See FED. JUD. CTR., JUDGES' CLASS ACTION NOTICE AND CLAIMS PROCESS CHECKLIST AND
PLAIN LANGUAGE GUIDE (2010), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/Not
Check.pdf/$file/NotCheck.pdf.
232. Henry Paul Monaghan, Antisuit Injunctions and Preclusion Against Absent
Nonresident Class Members, 98 COLUM. L. REv 1148, 1154, 1185 (1998).
233. Todd B. Hilsee et al., Do You Really Want Me To Know My Rights? The Ethics
Behind Due Process in Class Action Notice Is More Than Just Plain Language: A Desie To
Actually Inform, 18 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHics 1359, 1365 (2005).
234. Christopher R. Leslie, The Significance of Silence: Collective Action Problems
and Class Action Settlements, 59 FLA. L. REv. 71, 92 (2007) ("Because class action litigation
is designed to create a remedy for a large number of individual victims, who often are widely
dispersed, even under the best of circumstances many class members might not receive actual
notice of the class action litigation.").
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Unfamiliarity with the legal system generally, and with class actions
in particular, can also interfere with the foreign claimant's
comprehension of the class action notice. Class actions exist in few
jurisdictions outside the United States, so the class action concept may
be unknown to the foreign claimant. Thus, potential language issues,
unfamiliarity with the U.S. legal system, and the natural human
tendency to ignore that which we do not understand, all combine to
render notice potentially ineffectual for foreign claimants.235
These issues with notice to foreign claimants directly implicate
another pillar of due process: the class member's opportunity to opt
out. Only where a claimant receives and is able to understand the class
action notice can he exercise any meaningful choice to opt out of the
class action. Bassett observes that where the notice is not understood,
the absent class member will not opt out of the litigation. Instead, he
will remain in the class-though not by choice-which in turn "foils
the notion of implied consent to the court's jurisdiction."236
Finally, problems of adequate representation are particularly acute
with respect to foreign claimants. Because the class is usually
represented by American attorneys, there may be a danger that the
interests of foreign class members will be overlooked. The foreign
claimants may simply be seen as an "add on" to an American class,
less deserving of redress than American claimants, or at least less
likely to complain about inadequate recovery.23 The concern that
foreign claimants may be inadequately represented is evidenced in the
differential treatment accorded to U.S. and foreign claimants in the
U.S. breast implant litigation.238 Initially, a mere three percent of a $3
235. Bassett, supm note 6, at 65-66 (footnotes omitted); see also Buschkin, supra note
6, at 1582-83 ("When many of the potential class members live outside of the United States,
determining what constitutes adequate notice is more complicated. Linguistic and cultural
barriers make it more difficult to 'communicate effectively to [foreign] claimants their rights
and options.' If the judge is not familiar with the language, customs, literacy levels, or print-
media sources of the foreign countries in which the potential class members reside, it is
virtually impossible to draft an order identifying the 'best notice practicable under the
circumstances.' If the foreign class members do not receive adequate notice, they cannot be
bound to the class settlement or final judgment, because binding them without proper notice
would violate their due process rights." (footnotes omitted)).
236. Bassett, supra note 6, at 74.
237. Mulheron, supra note 151, at 441 (referring to "'Add-on' European Classes to
U.S. Class Actions").
238. Mulheron describes other instances of foreign (specifically English) claimants
not faring as well as their U.S. counterparts:
This was the scenario in Kruman v Chist~ie3Intemationalplc. In this case,
arising out of allegedly price-fixed commissions charged by auctioneers at
Christie's and Sotheby's in London, foreign class members (including English
purchasers of items at these London auction houses) had to continue to contest the
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billion global class settlement fund was allocated to non-U.S. citizens,
even though non-U.S. citizens comprised fifty percent of the class.239
After the initial settlement faltered, a subsequent settlement was
reached that provided non-U.S. claimants with only half the
compensation awarded to U.S. claimants.240
Thus, the additional hurdles faced by foreign claimants with
respect to notice, adequate representation, and the opportunity to opt
out suggest that due process may require that foreign claimants be
afforded the opportunity to opt into a class action,24' rather than have
their failure to exclude themselves from the action be construed as
tacit consent.242 Although courts have yet to accede to this argument, it
nonetheless lends further support to the idea that an opt-in class action
model for foreign claimants is preferable to the current opt-out regime.
3. An Opt-In Class Action Respects International Comity Better
than an Opt-Out Class Action
The practice of American courts including foreign class members
in transnational opt-out class actions rests on at least two interrelated
assumptions: First, U.S. courts are better positioned than foreign
courts or institutions to mete out justice, and second, foreign claimants
wantto be presumptively included in American class actions. Each of
these assumptions is questionable.
motion to dismiss. By contrast, the domestic U.S. class settled on favorable terms
(over $500 million in cash and discount benefits). Significantly, the recent BA-
Virgin settlement agreement reached by the District Court of the Northern District
of California was noted to be the first occasion upon which the domestic U.S. class
and an English class had been treated entirely equivalently in respect of the
compensation awarded.
Id. at 444 (footnotes omitted).
239. Bassett, supra note 6, at 70.
240. Id.
241. In a separate article, Bassett argues that an opt-in mechanism is more consistent
with due process for all class action claimants. See Debra Lyn Bassett, Just Go Away:
Representation, Due Process, and Preclusion in Class Actions, 2009 BYU L. REv 1079, 1118
("Direct representation in litigation-the foundational prerequisite for preclusion in nonclass
litigation-can be achieved in class litigation in a manner that both renders the application of
the preclusion doctrines more consistent and accords genuine due process protections. The
solution is not profound. The solution is not even novel, because it requires merely returning
to a previous practice that was in place before the 1966 amendments to Federal Rule 23, and
is still required by statute in some class litigation today. The solution is opt-in participation."
(footnotes omitted)).
242. Bassett, supra note 6, at 87 ("Requiring foreign claimants to affirmatively opt in,
rather than absurdly construing their silence as an agreement to be bound by the class
litigation, will ensure that their consent is genuine." (footnote omitted)).
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It has been said that owing to the inadequacy of aggregation
procedures and substantive remedies available abroad, the United
States provides the most viable forum in which plaintiffs can realize
some meaningful form of redress.243  Accordingly, one commentator
advances the argument that U.S. courts should adopt a "default
presumption in favor of including foreign claimants" in U.S. class
actions and that such claimants should only be excluded from the U.S.
action if they are able to "prove in their affidavits that [they] have an
adequate alternative remedy either in the U.S. courts or the courts of
their home countries."2" This position assumes that U.S. courts are
"better" than foreign courts at adjudicating grievances and ensuring
that foreign claimants are provided with access to justice.2 4 5 However,
we should be careful not to equate "access to justice" with access to
Ameican justice.246 That is, the superiority of the American system of
justice, including class procedures, should not be assumed.247
European countries, for instance, eschew what they perceive as
the litigious culture embodied in both the procedural and substantive
law of the United States. Instead, they generally rely upon
governmental regulation, public enforcement proceedings, and a
robust social safety net to safeguard the public interest. 248 One author
243. SeeBuschkin, supra note 6, at 1596-97.
244. Seeid.at 1569.
245. The literature is replete with references to the fact that U.S. justice is "better" than
justice meted out abroad. See, e.g, Saparoff & Beattie, supra note 12, at 680 ("The class
action suit is usually the best mechanism for foreign investors to seek justice and economic
recovery for securities fraud. Due to the uniqueness of these types of suits worldwide,
exclusion of 'f-cubed' plaintiffs risks a miscarriage ofjustice. . .
246. Mulheron notes:
At a recent conference on collective redress in London, one participant
expressed the view, in all seriousness, that an opt-out regime was not required in
English law, because English claimants had an increasing tendency to seek to be
joined to opt-out class actions instituted in the United States, and thus, they were
already "catered for."
Mulheron, supra note 151, at 441 (footnote omitted). She referred to the "assumption that the
English citizen would be prepared to condone a situation whereby the U.S. was an appropriate
forum to determine his or her rights and obligations in the absence of 'anything better' in
England" as "breathtaking." Id.
247. Speaking specifically about class actions, John Coffee notes: "[N]either the
optimality nor the transportability of the U.S. class action system should be assumed." John
C. Coffee, Jr., Litgation Governance: TakngAccountability Seriously, 110 COLUM. L. REV
288, 293 (2010).
248. Faulk, supm note 166, at 1001-02 ("The concept of the 'private attorney general,'
a citizen or advocate who represents the public interest and who uses the judicial system, as
opposed to parliamentary action, to advance social aims or redress public wrongs, is not
commonly accepted outside the borders of the United States.... Indeed, it appears that the
cultures of most democracies, other than the United States, have already determined that tort
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notes, "There is no empirical evidence that threats of litigation are
necessary to coerce responsible behavior and regulatory compliance,
nor is there evidence that current [European] regulations and
compensation programs are inadequate to protect personal and public
interests."249 To the extent that European countries are adopting
aggregate litigation devices, such devices are decidedly "un-
American." The development of a distinctly European collective
litigation culture250 demonstrates that different does not mean
nfei-or. 25
Just as it should not be assumed that American justice is
preferable to justice dispensed elsewhere, so too should it not be
assumed that foreign claimants necessarily wish to partake in U.S.
class actions. Here again, it is necessary to acknowledge the intricate
dynamics of class litigation. Foreign class members do not personally
appear before American courts seeking to be included in U.S. class
actions. Rather, class counsel proposes a class definition that
encompasses both domestic and foreign claimants.252 It is in class
counsel's financial interest for the class to be as large as possible-the
more claimants in the class, the larger the settlement value of the class
action, and the higher the eventual fee. Class counsel's motive in
seeking to include foreign claimants in the class is not altruistic, but
rather tied directly to the financial gains that are to be had by
increasing the number of claimants in the class. Similarly, when class
counsel and the defendant are seeking to certify a settlement class, the
inclusion of foreign class members serves a dual function: it increases
the potential fee for class counsel, and it provides defendants with
some modicum of peace. While it is clear that a foreign class member
will not necessarily be precluded from relitigating the action abroad, at
least the defendant will have discouraged such an attempt and set up
litigation is not an effective or efficient method to achieve social or personal justice. In those
nations, social security systems are the major methods of providing compensation and care
for persons who have sustained an injury." (footnotes omitted)).
249. Id. at 1002.
250. On the cultural construction of class action law generally, see Catherine Pich6,
The CulturalAnalysis of ClassAction Law, 2 J. Civ L. STuD. 10 1 (2009).
251. Coffee, supra note 247, at 329 ("From a governance perspective, the oldest
maxim is, 'One size doesn't fit all.' No one structure of corporate governance is optimal for
all firms. The same is likely true for litigation governance where legal systems and legal
cultures differ markedly." (footnote omitted)).
252. Id. at 298-99 ("Effectively, Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows
this [plaintiffs'] attorney, often using only a nominal client, to file an action that sets forth its
own proposed definition of the class of persons who will be bound by it; then, it is up to the
proposed class members to flee the class by opting out.").
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an additional obstacle for a foreign claimant. Thus, a careful look at
the interests at play-and, in particular, a look at the prime movers
behind the inclusion of foreign claimants in US. class actions-should
cast some doubt on the assumption that foreign claimants necessarily
wish to be included in U.S. class actions.
U.S. courts should be wary about perpetuating any assumption
that the United States is the best forum for the resolution of disputes or
that foreign claimants desire to be included in U.S. class actions.
However, presumptively including foreign claimants in US. opt-out
class actions-even after considering whether those foreign claimants'
home courts would accord res judicata effect to a U.S. judgment-
does just that. One author observes:
The use of U.S. . . . collective liability devices to resolve claims of
nonresident foreign litigants represents a major intrusion into the
internal social policies and cultures of other sovereign states. Although
"globalism" may be useful as a commercial clich6, its intrusion into
jurisprudence is disturbing, especially when procedural devices that are
not yet recognized internationally are used to resolve claims arising
from conduct that occurs beyond the forum state's borders.253
It is arrogant and imperialistic for U.S. courts to attempt to bind
foreign claimants to a result reached in an action thousands of miles
away that they had no knowledge of or control over.254 In fact, the
Supreme Court has expressed concerns about the propriety of U.S.
courts adjudicating the claims of foreigners, particularly in contexts
which involve the application of public law to foreign claimants.255 In
E Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd v Empagran S.A., for instance, the
Supreme Court refused to apply the Foreign Trade Antitrust
Improvement Act and the Sherman Act to claims based solely on
253. Faulk, supra note 166, at 1000.
254. This point has been made repeatedly in numerous defendants' motions resisting
certification of a class including foreign nationals, as well as the affidavits filed in support of
these motions. For instance, in the In re Royal Dutch/Shell Thansportation Securities
Litigation case, defendants argued that "considerations of international comity readily
confirm the impropriety of stretching the appropriate bounds of this Court's jurisdiction to
entertain those [foreign] claims." Royal Dutch/Shell Defendants Memorandum in Support of
Their Motion To Dismiss in Part for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction at 37, In re Royal
Dutch/Shell Transp. Sec. Litig., 380 F Supp. 2d 509 (D.N.J. 2005) (No. 04-374 (JWB)), 2004
WL 3929298 (D.N.J. June 30, 2005). The defendants noted that the governments of the
Netherlands and the United Kingdom-the two jurisdictions where Royal Dutch and Shell
Transport were incorporated-jointly filed amicus briefs submitting that "their respective
choices concerning the remedies available for particular types of commercial wrongdoing
were conscious and entitled to the respect of United States courts." Id at 38.
255. Normally, these concerns are voiced as part of the Court's analysis of subject
matter jurisdiction or forum non conveniens.
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foreign effects, reasoning, "Why should American law supplant, for
example, Canada's or Great Britain's or Japan's own determination
about how best to protect Canadian or British or Japanese customers
from anticompetitive conduct engaged in significant part by Canadian
or British or Japanese or other foreign companies?""' Similarly, in
Monson v NationalAustalia Bank Ltd, the Supreme Court held that
the antifraud provision of the Securities Exchange Act did not apply
extraterritorially to provide a cause of action to foreign plaintiffs suing
foreign and American defendants for misconduct in connection with
securities traded on foreign exchanges. 257 In support of its decision, the
Court emphasized that "[1]ike the United States, foreign countries
regulate their domestic securities exchanges and securities transactions
occurring within their territorial jurisdiction" and that this regulation
"often differs" from that of the United States.258
The thrust of these decisions is that restraint needs to be
demonstrated in adjudicating claims of foreign claimants in U.S. class
actions. An American court should not substitute its judgment for that
of a foreign court in deciding what is best for foreign claimants.259 An
opt-in class mechanism for foreign claimants exhibits appropriate
judicial restraint and respect for international comity. By allowing
foreign claimants to participate in a class action if they so wish, U.S.
courts are not forcing American procedures and American law upon
foreign claimants. Rather, they are making such procedures available
to foreign claimants, while respecting that foreign countries have
different-but equally legitimate-methods of resolving legal
disputes.260
256. 542 U.S. 155, 165 (2004).
257. 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2885 (2010).
258. Id.
259. Another interesting option for U.S. courts would be to cooperate with foreign
courts in fashioning global class settlements. SeeTodd J. Burke, Canadian ClassActionsand
Fedeal Judgments: Recognition of Foreign Class Actions in Canada, ABA Bus. L. TODAY,
Sept.-Oct. 2007, available at http://www.apps.americanbar.org/buslaw/blt/2007-09-1 0/burke.
shtml (discussing crossborder settlement efforts by U.S. and Canadian courts in the Nortel
case); see also INT'L LAW Ass'N, COMM. ON INT'L CIVIL LITIG. & THE INTERESTS OF THE PUB.,
PARis-Rio GUIDELINES OF BEST PRACTICES FOR TRANSNATIONAL GROUP ACTIONS § 8.1 (2008).
While this may be a viable option if the foreign claimants hail from a jurisdiction that has
adopted class mechanisms similar to those in the United States, it may be more problematic
in countries with no class action mechanism or with forms of collective redress that differ
significantly from Rule 23. Moreover, where the foreign claimants are geographically
dispersed over multiple countries, such transnational cooperation will undoubtedly prove
difficult.
260. Note also that the day will soon come when American courts will have to decide
whether to give effect to class or other aggregate judgments rendered by foreign courts
purporting to bind U.S. class members. Unless American courts are fully prepared to enforce
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4. An Opt-In Class Action for Foreign Claimants Sufficiently
Deters Defendant Misconduct
Clearly, an opt-in class action for foreign claimants has several
advantages: it eliminates concerns about res judicata; it does not
distinguish between similarly situated foreign claimants; it ensures that
foreign claimants are provided with adequate due process; and it
respects international comity. Despite these benefits, some argue that
only an opt-out class that includes foreign claimants can serve the
deterrent effect of class actions:
Excluding foreign claimants from U.S. class action lawsuits, when
these claimants cannot bring independent lawsuits or group actions
abroad, undermines the deterrent effect of the class device. The
deterrent effect of the class action only works because corporations
know that if they engage in fraud, price-fixing, or some other consumer
abuse, victims will band together and sue for large damages.....
Excluding foreign claimants from class action lawsuits removes, or
at least lessens, the economic risk of engaging in illegal conduct
because it removes an entire category of purchasers from the litigation
system.... Even if the wrongdoers have to pay out large damages to
U.S. purchasers, as long as courts exclude foreign claimants from class
action lawsuits the corporations retain a large portion of the foreign
profits. If the misconduct stretched far enough around the globe, there
is a realistic chance that the large sums gained from the foreign
misconduct would more than make up for the U.S. liability. U.S. courts
can deter such conduct only if all claimants, both domestic and foreign,
are permitted to sue as a class.
According to this view, an opt-in class action for foreign claimants
would undermine the deterrent effect of class actions.
While the argument carries a superficial measure of appeal, it
must be more carefully scrutinized in light of the actual mechanics of
class action procedure. The deterrence argument assumes that the
larger the class in terms of sheer numbers, the larger the payout by a
defendant, thus maximizing the deterrent effect of class actions.
such foreign judgments, they would be wise to exhibit some restraint in assuming jurisdiction
over foreign claimants in U.S. class actions. See, e.g., Silver v. Imax Corp. 2009 CarswellOnt
7873 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.) (WL) (certifying a securities fraud class action which includes
absent U.S. claimants); Silver v. 1max Corp., [2011] 105 O.R. 3d 212, paras. 57-65 (Can. Ont.
Sup. Ct. J.) (affirming the certification decision).
261. Buschkin, supra note 6, at 1588, 1591 (footnotes omitted) (affirming the
certification decision); see also Saparoff & Beattie, supra note 12, at 671 (noting that courts
should include foreign investors in securities class action inter alia because "including foreign
investors will promote securities fraud settlements and deter future fraud").
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Under this logic, if there are 10,000 U.S. class members and 2000
foreign class members, a defendant will pay twenty percent more to
settle a class action encompassing all claimants than it would to settle a
class action involving only U.S. claimants. The problem with this
argument is that normally, the amount that a defendant will pay to
settle a claim corresponds to the number of clains that are filed by
class members, not the number of class members in absolute terms.
Issacharoff and Miller explain how this works as follows:
Attorneys in U.S. cases have found ways to make class action
settlements resemble outcomes under an opt-in rule. When a common
fund is created, some settlements contain "reverter" clauses providing
that any amounts not claimed revert to the defendant. Reverter
settlements are no longer seen in securities class actions, but reverters
are occasionally found in other contexts. Much more common these
days is the consumer class action settlement where the defendant
promises to provide relief in a defined amount to every class member
who files a claim. These settlements, as a practical matter, are similar
to settlements under opt-in class actions because the defendant ends up
having to pay out only to those class members who file claims-usually
only a fraction of the class.26
Using the above example, if only 100 out of 2000 foreign class
members file valid claim forms pursuant to the settlement, the
defendant will indeed internalize the cost of the foreign misconduct--
but only to the extent of the additional 100 claimants.263 Thus,
including foreign class members in a U.S. class action will increase the
262. Issacharoff& Miller, supra note 101, at 207-08 (footnotes omitted).
263. The number of class members who file claim forms as a percentage of the total
number of members in the class is very low. Coffee elaborates:
Although the opt-out class action includes everyone, relatively low percentages of
the class may actually file claims after a settlement is achieved. Professors Cox
and Thomas find that less than thirty percent of the institutional investors in the
securities class actions that they studied filed claims after a settlement had been
reached. In some special contexts, the rate is even less and may fall to one percent
or lower. Because institutional investors generally hold claims for significant
amounts (at least in proportion to the minimal cost of filing a claim) and because
they are generally thought to be sophisticated, this evidence suggests that
proponents of the opt-out class have overstated their case and that the presumed
difference in participation may be largely illusory. Even if the opt-out class action
includes the passive holders of negative value claims, these negative value
claimants do not actually benefit from such an action where, for whatever reason,
they fail to file a claim. In short, apathy reemerges at the back end of the opt-out
class action where a procedure resembling the act of opting in remains necessary if
the class member is to receive compensation.
Coffee, supmd note 247, at 334 (footnotes omitted); see also Issacharoff & Miller, supma note
101, at 205.
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deterrent effect of class actions, but only marginally so." At the very
least, the argument that supports the inclusion of foreign claimants in
U.S. class action in order to maximize deterrence should be
approached with some degree of caution; the argument certainly is not
sufficiently compelling to overcome the many advantages associated
with an opt-in class for foreign claimants.
V. CONCLUSION
As consumer, securities, and financial markets have become
increasingly global, so too has class litigation. Plaintiffs (or more
accurately, their attorneys) posit that access to justice, judicial
efficiency, and deterrence mandate that U.S. courts include foreign
claimants in American class actions. Defendants respond that the
inclusion of foreign class members potentially compromises their due
process rights by exposing them to the risk of relitigation abroad.
Because an American court cannot bind a foreign claimant in the same
way it can a domestic claimant, defendants can never be assured that
an American proceeding will be res judicata in respect of the claims of
foreign class members. American courts, in an effort to be responsive
to the res judicata issue, now incorporate into the Rule 23 superiority
analysis an assessment of the likelihood that a foreign court would
grant preclusive effect to a U.S. class judgment abroad. The more
likely a foreign court would, in the eyes of a U.S. court, grant
preclusive effect to a US. class judgment, the more likely those
claimants will be included in the U.S. class.
This Article has argued that U.S. courts are engaging in an
illusory search for res judicata because it will never be possible for a
US. court to know with any degree of certainty what the preclusive
effects of its own judgment will be. In particular, litigation
dynamics-such as the proving of foreign law by partisan experts, the
principle of party prosecution, and the distinction between contested
and settlement-only certification-hinder the ability of a court to make
an accurate determination as to the res judicata effect of a U.S. class
judgment abroad. More importantly, however, there are structural
restrictions on the search for res judicata that stem from exactly what
U.S. courts are called upon to analyze: whether a judgment or
264. Note that there are other ways that the parties might structure a settlement
agreement that do not involve a reverter or reversionary settlement. For instance, parties
might allocate any residual balance of the settlement fund to a designated charity by way of a
cy-pres distribution. See, e.g., Sam Yospe, Note, Cy Pres Disributions in Class Action
Settlements, 3 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 1014 (2009).
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settlement not yet in existence would, at some later point in time, be
enforced by a foreign court. The complexity of foreign law on the
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments generally, as well as
the lack of comparable class procedures elsewhere, greatly limits the
ability of a U.S. court to ascertain whether or not a U.S. class judgment
would be enforceable in a given foreign court. Moreover, the
preclusive effect of a particular class judgment can never be predicted
by a court ex ante because an absent class member can always
challenge the judgment on grounds that are specific or "intrinsic" to
the class judgment itself.
Given these serious limitations on the search for res judicata, I
argue that U.S. courts should not be in the business of speculating as to
the anticipated preclusive effect of their judgments abroad. Not only is
such speculation inherently unreliable, but the entire practice yields an
unprincipled determination of whether or not to include foreign class
members in U.S. class actions. Instead, U.S. courts should seek to
avoid the res judicata problem altogether by fashioning an opt-in
mechanism for foreign claimants. An opt-in mechanism would
expand the perceived benefits of US. class actions to all foreign
claimants, not simply those who reside in jurisdictions that the United
States perceives would enforce a U.S class judgment. In addition, an
opt-in class action for foreign claimants pays due respect to comity
concerns and offers absent foreign class members heightened due
process protections.
Bermann has observed: "[T]he multinational character of today's
classes complicates class action practice significantly."265 But, perhaps
American courts have made transnational class actions too
complicated. Perhaps the solution lies in the adoption of a simple opt-
in mechanism for foreign claimants. Perhaps the time has come for
American courts to abandon their search for res judicata.
265. Bermann, supm note 1, at 93.
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